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COMMENTS
THE FALLACY OF FARBER: FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE IN CRIMINAL CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1970's, a growing number of
newspaper and broadcast journalists' have sud-
denly become celebrities in a way that none of
them could have wished. Reporters such as Wil-
liam Farr, Peter Bridge, and most recently, Myron
Farber, have become famous-because they have
gone to jail. These persons arejournalists who were
ordered by courts to identify confidential sources
of information. All declined to do so, and for their
refusal, were ordered punished for contempt.
These reporters went to jail in the name of a
principle-but it is a principle whose constitutional
foundation has never been explicitly sanctioned by
the Supreme Court of the United States.2 This
principle, often claimed but sometimes rejected, is
known as the newsman's privilege. It is the right
claimed byjouirnalists to refuse to testify, or other-
wise supply information, in judicial, legislative, or
administrative pioceedings, about their confiden-
tial news sources or confidential knowledge ob-
tained in the course of news gathering. Proponents
of the privilege have claimed, at differing times,
that it is derived from the common law, the first or
fifth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion, or various state statutes.
Branzburg v. Hayes,5 decided June 29, 1972, is the
Supreme Court's only comprehensive examination
of the subject. The five-to-four decision, authored
by Mr. Justice White, opened with this unequivo-
'The terms journalist, newsman, reporter, and the
press will 6e utilized interchangeably in this comment.
The question of just who is a journalist is one that has
troubled both courts dealing with privilege claims and
legislatures trying to formulate adequate shield laws. In
this comment, the terms mean those persons directly
involved in the processes of gathering, researching, writ-
ing, editing, photographing, illustrating, reporting, ana-
lyzing, commenting on, or broadcasting information for
public consumption through media of mass communi-
cation and dissemination of news. These media would
include newspapers, magazines, other periodicals, wire
services, news or feature syndicates, radio, television, and
broadcasting networks.
2 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
3 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
cal declaration: "The issue in these cases is whether
requiring newsmen to appear and testify before
federal and state grand juries abridges the freedom
of speech and press guaranteed by the First
Amendment. We hold that it does not."
4
Despite these strong words, however, the Court's
opinion left considerable room for uncertainty and
conflicting interpretation. Different judges, later
ruling on privilege claims in other cases, came to
diametrically dissimilar conclusions-all citing
Branzburg as the authority for their decisions.a
The case that once again has kindled national
interest in this issue is In re Farber,6 the celebrated
1978 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which held that any newsman's privilege must
yield to the constitutional rights of a defendant in
a criminal prosecution. Although the United States
Supreme Court did not choose to take certiorari in
the case,7 In re Farber still must be regarded as a
significant decision, not because it attracted na-
tionwide attention, but because its holding adopts
a more inimical stance toward immunity for jour-
nalists than most other courts have taken in recent
years. The Farber decision already has been cited
by other judges,8 and it raises important questions
about the future of this issue in the courts.
4 Id. at 667.
5 As an example of two courts that interpreted Branz-
burg in dramatically different ways, see Florida v. Petran-
toni, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1554 (Cir. Ct. 1978), a
criminal case in which a judge cited Justice White's
plurality opinion in Brawburg as the first of several au-
thorities for a "broad first amendment privilege against
compelled testimony and production of documents," and
People v. Monroe, 88 Misc. 2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007
(Sup. Ct. 1975), a criminal case in which the court ruled
that Branzburg created no testimonial privilege, either
absolute or qualified, for a reporter in any phase of
criminal proceedings from grand jury testimony through
trial.
6 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, -U.S.-, 98 S.
Ct. 598 (1978).7 See -U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 598 (1978) (denial of certior-
ari).
" Cases citing Farber in refusing to recognize a news-
man's privilege that were decided in the first few months
after the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling include
The primary purpose of this comment will be to
examine the application of the privilege doctrine
in criminal cases and grand jury testimony, and
the result in Farber will be contrasted with other
recent decisions in the area. The history of the
newsman's privilege issue and the sources of the
doctrine will be outlined initially, followed by a
review of the Supreme Court's holding in Branzburg
and of those cases, both civil and criminal, that
have been decided in the years since Branwburg. The
comment will next examine the Farber decision
itself, including both the complex procedural de-
velopment of the case and the four opinions au-
thored by members of the New Jersey Supreme
Court. Finally, the comment will analyze the Farber
decision and other lower court criminal law/news-
man's privilege cases, and will suggest alternatives
for judicial resolution of the controversy.
II. THE CENTRAL ISSUE
The conflict at issue here is a clash between two
vital guarantees of the United States Constitu-
tion-the right of free press9 and the right to just
and orderly judicial process.'0 It is impossible for
the two systems protected by these constitutional
guarantees to operate simultaneously under con-
ditions of absolute freedom, as cases like Branzburg
and Farber clearly demonstrate. Society must thus
make choices: either one of the systems must be
permitted to function at a level of maximum effi-
ciency, with a resulting loss in the flexibility and
freedom of the other, or a balance must be struck
between the two absolutes.
In reality, of course, there are, and always have
been, a variety of constraints upon both the free
press and the judicial process. The common law of
libel and obscenity and the "clear and present
danger" 11 and "fighting words"' 2 doctrines are ex-
United States v. Digilio, No. 74-313 (D.N.J. 1978) (mag-
istrate's opinion, unreported) and In re Powers, 4 MED.
L. REP. (BNA) 1600 (Vt. Dist. Ct. 1978). Mr. Justice
White's opinion refusing to grant a stay in the Farber case,
New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct.
6 (1978), was cited in New York v. Zagarino, 4 MED. L.
REP. (BNA) 1693 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
'The first amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted by the witnesses against
him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor...." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
"E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
i2E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
amples of restrictions imposed upon freedom of the
press. Similarly, the fifth amendment's right
against self-incrimination,13  the "exclusionary
rule"'14 and, significantly, common law and statu-
tory testimonial privileges for lawyer-client, 5 doc-
tor-patient, 6 priest-penitent 17 and husband-wife8
relationships all impair, to some degree. the effi-
ciency and "truth-finding" function of the judicial
system.
The importance of a free press has been acknowl-
edged since the beginnings of the Republic,' 9 but
because no special training or licensing was needed
to become a journalist, and because the journalist
did not have a responsibility to provide individual
assistance to specific clients, society, and the law
did not vest the newsman with the same testimonial
privilege given lawyers and doctors. No benefits
were believed to derive from recognizing a confi-
dential relationship between a reporter and his
source that would justify a testimonial privilege for
the reporter.
[lit has ... been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public... has a right to every man's
evidence.
In general ... the mere fact that a communication was
made in express confidence, or in the implied confidence
of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege
.... No pledge of privacy, nor oath of secrecy, can
avail against demand for the truth in a court of
justice .... Accordingly, a confidential communi-
cation ... to a journalist ... is not pri';ileged from
disclosure. 20
'aThe fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'" E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5 E.g., People v. Adam, 51 111. 2d 46, 280 N.E.2d 205,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A,
§ 201(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
84A-20 (West 1979).
16E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
'7 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1976); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
1' E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22 (West 1979); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
19 See, e.g., Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 16-22 (1941); THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. HAM-
ILTON); XII PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 48-49 (J. P.
Boyd ed. 1955) (letter to Col. Edward Carrington, Jan.
16, 1787); VI W~rrINCS OF JAMES MADISON 1790-1802,
335 (1906).
0 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2286 (Mc-
Naughton) rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis supplied).
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Although nineteenth century law did not rec-
ognize a newsman's privilege, confidentiality was
seldom challenged in the courts and reporters, with
little fear, made regular use of such sources. As
journalism grew in professional stature and power
during the twentieth century and the trend in print
media swung toward more in-depth, investigative
reporting, dependence on confidential sources in-
creased."1 Indeed, most newsmen recognized that
some of their most important stories would never
have been written without the aid of confidential
sources.
22
The American Newspaper Guild acknowledged
this important tool of newsgathering and recog-
nized the responsibilities attendant to its use, when
it adopted the first code of ethics for journalists in
1934. The code.included this provision: "Newspa-
permen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose
sources of confidential information in court or
before judicial or investigative bodies."'ss
Still, the true test of reporters' resolve did not
emerge until the late 1960's. It was during those
years that governmental agencies turned to the
press subpoena as a helpful and convenient means
of gathering information about dissidents. Report-
ers resisted these subpoenas-and the clash be-
tween free press and judicial process ensued.
This, then, is the basic issue in the battle over
newsman's privilege. It is a confrontation rooted in
social mores and ethical values as well as law-and
it is a conflict without any easy answers or simple
solutions.
Ill. THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORY OF THE NEws-
MAN'S PRIVILEGE
American journalists have been insisting for at
least 130 yearsH that they should not be forced to
reveal the identity of their news sources. This claim
has been supported, at differing times, by one or
more of four basic legal arguments.
21 See Blasi, The Newsmen's Privilege: An Empirical Study,
70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 234, 252-53 (1971).
22 See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument
for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18,
43-44 (1969); The Justice and the Journalist, THE NATION,.
Sept. 18, 1972. Newsmen also have acknowledged their
dependence upon confidential sources in their own books
and articles. Set, e.g., B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL
THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974), which details use Washing-
ton Post reporters made of confidential sources in expos-
in%;he Watergate scandal.
American Newspaper Guild Code of Ethics, reprinted
in G. BIRD & F. MERWIN, THE NEWSPAPER IN SOCIETY 567
(1942).
24 See note 29 & accompanying text infra.
*Common law. Throughout the second half of the
nineteenth century, newsmen contended that such
a privilege ought to be recognized in the common
law, but that claim was rejected repeatedly by the
judges writing the common law.s2
*Shield laws. Near the end of the century, the
idea was first advanced that immunity for reporters
could be secured through the enactment of state
statutes-known today as shield laws-but it was*
not until the 1930's that this proposal began mak-
ing any real headway in state legislatures. More
than half of the states now have shield laws, but
courts generally have construed them quite strictly
and thus often effectively have denied journalists
their protection.2
*Fiflh amendment. In a limited number of cases
where reporters have actually witnessed, or have
direct knowledge of, criminal conduct on the part
of their news sources, the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination has been invoked tojus-
tify a newsman's refusal to testify. The fifth amend-
ment theory is not used often, however, since it
covers only a small number of the possible situa-
tions in which a reporter might wish to refuse to
testify.
27
*First amendment. In 1958, it was suggested for
the first time that the true foundation for a news-
man's privilege might be found in the first amend-
ment.' Twenty years later, the development of
appellate doctrine indicates, that some degree of
protection for the press is derived from the first
amendment, but the scope of that protection has
not yet been clearly defined.
A. THE COMMON LAW ARGUMENT
The earliest reported case involving a newsman
who refused to reveal his sources is Exparte Nugent,2
an 1848 decision. John Nugent, a reporter covering
the United States Senate for the New York Herald,
had obtained confidential documents concerning
a proposed treaty to end the Mexican-American
War. After the secret drafts appeared in print, the
Senate subpoenaed Nugent and demanded that he
reveal his source. He refused, and for his defiance
was arrested for contempt of the Senate. Nugent
then sought his freedom through a writ of habeas
corpus. The Nugent opinion does not indicate
whether any specific claim for a newsman's privi-
See note 38 & accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 42-45 & accompanying text infra.
27 See note 50 & accompanying text infra.
' Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 910 (1958).
2 18 F. Cas. 471 (No. 10,375) (D.C. Cir. 1848).
19791
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lege was made before the court. If such an argu-
ment were made however, it apparently had no
effect upon the decision for Nugent's arrest was
upheld. The court rested its judgment on the in-
herent and sole power of the Senate to judge its
own contempts'
°
The gestation of the common law privilege doc-
trine can be seen more clearly in an 1857 legislative
decision, also stemming from a congressional con-
tempt citation. James Simonton, a Washington
correspondent for the New York Times, had re-
ported that several unnamed members of the
House of Representatives had taken bribes in re-
turn for their votes on land grants in the Minnesota
Territory."' A House select committee investigating
the charges called the reporter to testify, but he
refused to disclose the identities of either his source
or the alleged bribetakers. In defense of his actions,
Simonton told the committee: "I do not decline in
order to screen the members; my declination was
based upon my own conviction of duty.... I do
not see how I can answer ... without a dishonor-
able breach of confidence. ' 's2 Apparently neither
the committee nor the full House was impressed by
Simonton's motives. A contempt citation was is-
sued upon a 136-23 vote.33
The first case in which the highest court of a
state was called on to resolve a claim of privilege
was Pledger v. State a4 decided in 1886 by the Georgia
Supreme Court. In Pledger, which was a prosecution
for criminal libel, the court held that a newspaper
publisher could not refuse to reveal the identity of
a reporter who had written a story appearing in
his newspaper. A defiant publisher would be sub-
ject to fines and imprisonment for contempt, as
well as court-assigned liability for the libel.s3
In People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York
County,36 a 1936 decision that was later cited fre-
quently, the New York Court of Appeals held that
a reporter could not rely on his promises of confi-
dentiality in refusing to answer a grand jury's
questions about gambling activities.3 7 The issue as
framed in that case was not unlike that which the
3DId. at 483.
31 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., 274-75 (1857).
*n ld. at 403.
3Id. at 413. By the terms of the contempt resolution,
Simonton was to be held in custody until he testified, or
for the remainder of the legislative session. It is not known
whether the reporter ever acquiesced, but Congress ad-
journed six weeks later on March 3, 1857.
3' 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320 (1886).
"5 Id. at 248, 3 S.E. at 322.
36 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
"- Id. at 295, 199 N.E. at 416.
United States Supreme Court later addressed in
Branzburg.
These and subsequent cases demonstrate that
American courts have never extended a friendly
reception to claims of a common-law privilege.38
Indeed, no state without statutory protection for
newsmen has ever recognized a privilege at com-
mon law.39
B. THE SHIELD LAW ARGUMENT
Since appellate courts were unwilling to accept
a newsman's privilege at common law, journalists
next sought protection from the legislatures. The
Maryland General Assembly became the first body
to enact a shield law in 1896, but not until 1933
would another state-New Jersey-follow suit.
38 The American Law Reports notes at least 11 cases
prior to 1958 in which state and federal appellate courts
were called upon to decide whether journalists had a
common-law privilege not to disclose information or
sources. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966). In all 11
cases, the courts refused to recognize such a privilege.
The 1958 date is of significance in this respect because
that was the year in which Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d
545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), was de-
cided. Garland was the first such case in which a reporter
suggested the testimonial privilege might be grounded in
the first amendment, in addition to the common law. See
notes 52-56 & accompanying text infra. Since the Garland
decision, journalists have seldom depended upon the
common law as the source of their defense. The earlier
cases cited at 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966) are:
Brewster v. Boston rierald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D.
416 (D. Mass. 1957); People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48
P. 75 (1897); Ex purte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 4 8 P. 124
(1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919);
Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Plunkett v.
Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Pledger v.
State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887); In re Wayne, 4
Hawaii Dist. F. 475 (1914); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235,
85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of
New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936);
People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (9 Sup. Ct.
Reports, N.Y. 1874). With one exception, this list is
composed entirely of cases that arose in the criminal law
context, either at trial or in instances where newsmen
refused to testify before grand juries investigating possible
criminal activities. Both the Durrant and Plunkett cases
involved murder trials; the Pledger decision stemmed from
an indictment for criminal libel; The Phelps, Lawrence,
Grunow, Wayne, Joslyn, Mooney, and Clein judgments all
involved grand juries, and Brewster involved a civil libel
action.
' See Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439, 440
(S.D. Tex. 1969).
4' MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (Cum.
Supp. 1978). In December 1886 and January 1887, Bal-
timore Sun reporter John T. Morris was jailed for 17
days for refusing to reveal his sources for a story he wrote
detailing a grand jury's vote on an election fraud indict-
[Vol. 70
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By the time the United States Supreme Court
decided Branzburg in 1972, nineteen states had cre-
ated some sort of statutory protection for newsmen.
In Branzburg, Justice White,.after rejecting the first
amendment claims for privilege, added that both
Congress and the various state legislatures were
free to implement any sort of shield law they felt
necessary or desirable.41 Since then, seven states
appear to have accepted Justice White's invitation,
bringing to twenty-six the number which have
privilege statutes. In addition, ten states substan-
tially strengthened their existing shield laws
through amendments or totally new enactments
following Branzburg. New Jersey, the state in which
the Farber case would be decided, was one of those
ten.'2
ment. The arrest is said to have been the catalyst for the
passage 10 years later of the first state shield law, enacted
by the Maryland General Assembly. A misplaced digit
in early historical accounts of the incident caused authors
of several law review comments and journalism treatises
to report erroneously that the Morris arrest took place
only two months before passage of the Maryland shield
law, but this misconception was corrected by Professor
A. David Gordon of Northwestern University's Medill
School of Journalism in Gordon, 1896 Maryland Shield
Law, The American Roots of Evidentiay Pivilege for Newsmen,
JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS No. 22 (Feb. 1972).
"41 At the federal level, Congress has freedom to
determine whether a statutory newsmen's privilege
is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards
and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary
to deal with the evil discerned and, equally impor-
tant, to refashion those rules as experience from
time to time may dictate. There is also merit in
leaving state legislatures free, within First Amend-
ment limits, to fashion their own standards in light
of the conditions and problems with respect to the
relations between law enforcement officials and
press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of
course, that we are powerless to bar state courts
from responding in their own way and construing
their own constitutions so as to recognize a news-
man's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
408 U.S. at 706.
42 The statutory citations for the 26 states which now
have newsman's shield laws are: ALA. CODE § 12-21-142
(Cum. Supp. 1978); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150, .160
(Cum. Supp. 1978); ARtz. REv. STAT. § 12.2237 (Supp.
1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1070 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 4320-26
(1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp.
1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (Cum. Supp. 1978); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-54 (West Supp. 1978); MD.
Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (Cum. Supp.
1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 93-601-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 20-144 to 147 (1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 49.275
As indicated in Table 1, the scope of the various
shield laws varies dramatically.43 Some states pro-
vide what is known as an "absolute" privilege: the
journalist cannot be compelled to testify before any
official body under any circumstances as to either
his information or the sources from which he ob-
tained that information. Prior to the Farber deci-
sion, New Jersey's shield law was believed to pro-
vide an absolute privilege.44 In recent years how-
ever, more states have tended to enact qualified
shield laws. These statutes provide only limited
protection and include exceptions for certain cir-
cumstances in which a reporter may be compelled
to testify, such as libel actions, or instances where
there is "an overriding public interest" in disclo-
sure. Shield laws also tend to differ with regard to
the persons who are permitted to claim their pro-
tection, whether both sources and information, or
only sources are safeguarded, and when and how
the privilege is waived.
The Farber case clearly emphasizes what may
actually be the biggest single constraint upon the
benefit of legislatively enacted press shields: the
restriciive interpretations placed upon them by
state courts. Several other cases in this decade
demonstrate the tendency of appellate jurists to
'construe these laws narrowly.'5 Indeed, the New
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21, 21a (West Supp.
1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y.
Civ. Rtrres LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-01-06.2 (1978); OHto REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12 (Baldwin Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§
44.510-540 (1977); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 330 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3
(Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-113 to 115 (Supp.
1977).
43 To compare the current state shield laws with those
in effect prior to the Branzburg decision, contrast Table I
with a similar chart appearing in D'Alemberte,Journalists
Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Information,
6 HARV. J. LEcIS. 305, 327-30 (1969).
"See relevant portions of the New Jersey Newspaper-
man's Privilege Law at note 209 infra, and also Justice
Pashman's dissent in In re Farber, 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d
at 344.
"For example, Paul Branzburg, the Louisville Cour-
ier-Journal reporter whose name is identified with the
Supreme Court's 1972 privilege decision, initially sought
to avoid appearances before two different grand juries by
claiming, inter alia, protection under what was thought to
be an "absolute" reporter's shield law. Kentucky's highest
judicial body, the Court of Appeals, conceded that the
statute allowed a newsman to refuse to identify his news
sources, but then held that the law did not apply when
the reporter had actually witnessed the commission of a
crime. When Branzburg's sources converted marijuana





Publica-(Most Persons Covered Media Included Absolute Qualified Where Asserted What Covered tion
Amend- Required
ment)
Alabama 1935 Engaged, employed, Newspaper, radio, tele- Yes Anywhere Source Yes(1949) connected with newspa- vision
per, radio, or television
1967 Public official or re-
porter
1937 Engaged in, connected
(1960) with, or employed by
newspaper, radio, or
television
Not specifed No Court may order testi-
mony as may be in the






1936 Editor, reporter, writer Newspaper, periodical, No Must have written, pub- Anywhere (but this §(1949) for any newspaper, or radio lished, or broadcast in appears in title on crim-
periodical or radio sta- good faith, without mal- inal procedure only)
tion or publisher of any ice, and in the public in-
newspaper or periodical terest





1965 Publisher, editor, re- Newspaper, magazine,
(1974) porter, or other person other periodicals, press
connected with or em- association, wire service,
ployed or formerly con- radio, television
nected with or em-
ployed
1973 Journalist, scholar, edu- Any medium using fa-
cator, polemicist, or cilities for mass repro-
other persons either duction of words,
principally employed in sounds or images to
or spending 20 hours a general public






ployer, or supervisor of
all of the above.
Yes Applies to contempt ci- Anywhere
tations only
No Court may order testi-
mony or information
only if in public interest,
and on source also if re-
porter's statement
proven untrue. Reporter
cannot be eyewitness to
or participant in, physi-
cal violence or property
damage
Source and information
(includes all notes, out-
takes, photographs,
tapes or other data)
Source (if reporter ac-
tually communicates








1971 Engaged in collecting, Newspaper, periodical, No Court may order testi-
writing, or editing news news service, radio, tele- mony if essential to pub-
for publication vision, community an- lic interest and inrorma-
tenna television service, tion not available from
news reels, motion pic- any alternative source.




Anywhere1949 Any person connected Newspaper or periodi-
(1973) with or formerly con- cal published at regular
nected with; bonafide intervals and having
owner, editorial or re- general circulation;
portorial employee who press association, wire
receives principal in- service, licensed radio,
come from legitimate or television
gathering, writing, edit-
ing, and interpretation
of the news. Any person
connected with licensed
radio or television sta-
tion as owner, official or
as an editorial or repor-







1936 Any person engaged,
(1952) employed, connected
Newspaper, radio, tele- Yes
vision
1964 Reporter (one regularly Newspaper, periodical
engaged in collecting, (issued at regular inter-
writing, editing news vals and having paid
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AnywhereNewspaper, journal, ra- Yes
dio, television















Enacted (MostPubfica-(Most Persons Covered edia Included Absolute Qualified Where Asserted What Covered tion
Amend- Required
ment)






cation to the public
1943 Any person engaged, or Newspaper, news ser-
(1977) who was so engaged vice, radio, telev; 'on,
when information or community - :atenna
sought was procured, television service
connected, or employed
for purpose of gather-
ing, writing, editing, or
disseminating news
1973 Any person engaged in Includes, but not lim-
procuring, gathering, ited to, newspaper,
writing, editing or dis- magazine, periodical,
seminating news or book, pamphlet, news
other information to service, wire service,
the public news or feature syndi-
cate, broadcast station
or network, or large tel-
evision system
1969 No reporter, former re- Newspaper, periodical,
(1977) porter, or editorial em- press association, radio,
ployee (and in radio television
and television, any em-
ployee)
1933 Person engaged in, or
(1977) employed for the pur-
pose of gathering, pro-
curing, transmitting,
compiling, editing or
sure if source has infor-
mation on commission
of a crime, information
cannot be obtained
through alternative














and any notes, memo-
randa, recording tapes,




and all notes, outtakes,
photographs, films,
tapes, or other data
Source or information
Source, author, means,
agency or person from











tronic means of dissemi-
nating news to general
public
New Mexico 1967 Journalist or newscaster Newspaper, magazine,
(1973) (any person who, for press association, news
gain, is engaged in service, wire service,
gathering, preparing, news or feature syndi-
editing, analyzing, com- cate, broadcast or tele-
menting on, or broad- vision station, or net-
casting news, or who work, or cable television
was so engaged at the system
time a source or infor-
mation was procured)
or working associates of
journalists or newscas-
ters
No Court can order disclo-






nated or delivered; and
any news or informa-
tion obtained in the
course of pursuing his
professional activities
Source or information
1970 Person, who for gain Newspaper published at Yes
(1975) and livelihood, is en- least once a week, mag-
gaged in gathering, pre- azine with paid cireula-
paring, or editing of tion, news agency, press
news (for print media) association, wire service,
or analyzing, comment- radio or television
ing on or broadcasting transmission station, or
news (by radio or tele- network
vision)
Anywhere Source or information
North Dakota 1973 Person engaged in gath- Any organization pub-
ering, writing, photo- lishing or broadcasting
graphing, or editing news
news and employed or
acting for (see Media
Included)
No Court can order disclo-
sure to prevent miscar-
riage ofjustice
Anywhere
1941 Any person engaged in, Newspaper, press asso-
(1977) connected with or em- ciation, commercial or
ployed by; for purposes noncommercial radio,














Oklahoma 1974 Reporter, photogra- Newspaper, magazine, No Court may require dis- Anywhere Source or information No
(1978) pher, editor, commenta- other periodical, book, closure if information is
tor, journalist, announ- pamphlet, news service, shown, by clear and
cer, or others engaged wire service, news or convincing evidence, to
in obtaining, writing, feature syndicate, be relevant to significant
reviewing, editing, or broadcast station or issue in action, and is
otherwise preparing network, cable televi- not available through
news sion system alternate means
1973 Any person connected Newspaper, magazine
with, employed by or or other periodical,
engaged in any me- book, pamphlet, news
dium of communication service, wire service,
to the public or for- news or feature syndi-
merly employed or en- cate, broadcast station
gaged or network, cable televi-
sion systems
Pennsylvania 1937 Engaged in, connected Newspaper or magazine
(1968) with, employed by; in of general circulation,
order to gather, pro- press association, radio,
cure, compile, edit, television
publish news
Rhode Island 1971 Reporter, editor, com- Newspaper or periodi-
mentator, journalist, cal issued at regular in-
writer, correspondent, tervals and having paid
news photographer, or circulation, press associ-
other person engaged in ation, newspaper syndi-
gathering or presenta- cate, wire service, radio, -
tion of news television
1973 A person engaged in
gathering information
for publication or
broadcast, either if con-
nected with or em-
ployed by, or if inde-
pendently engaged
News media or press
No Does not apply in defa- Anywhere
mation actions
Yes Radio or television must Anywhere
keep transcription or re-
cording of broadcast
No Court may require dis- Anywhere
closure if necessary to
permit felony prosecu-
tion or to prevent a
threat to life, when in-
formation is not avail-
able from other wit-
nesses. Does not apply
in defamation actions or
to information already
made public.
No Court may require dis- Anywhere
closure if information re-
lates to specific, proba-
ble violation of law, it
cannot be obtained
through alternate means











THE FALLACY OF FARBER
Mexico Supreme Court struck down its state's
shield law as a violation of the state constitution's
being news solirces and became criminals instead. Branz-
burg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v.
Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Both William Farr and Peter Bridge, two reporters
who served widely publicized, highly controversial jail
sentences in the early 1970's for their refusal to disclose
sources and information, erroneously thought they were
protected by state shield laws.
During the 1970 Charles Manson murder trial, the
presiding judge, in an attempt to avoid prejudicial pre-
trial publicity, issued an order to all the attorneys in-
volved in the case, restricting the information they could
provide to the press. Farr, then a reporter for the Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner, obtained a copy of a witness's
deposition and wrote a story based on it. Later, he left
the newspaper's staff for ajob with the district attorney's
office. After the Manson trial had ended, the judge
initiated contempt proceedings against Farr and de-
manded to know who had supplied him with the depo-
sition. Farr refused to name his source, claiming the
protection of the California shield law. Upon review
however, a state court of appeals denied him immunity.
Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60,99 Cal. Rptr.
342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). Although
California's statute was theoretically of the "absolute"
variety, the appeals court said that permitting Farr to
employ it in this case "would be to countenance an
unconstitutional interference by the legislative branch
with an inherent and vital power of the court to control
its own proceedings and officers."Id at 69,'99 Cal. Rptr.
at 348. The state court also suggested, -but did not
actually hold, that the shield law would not protect an
ex-newsman like Farr. That dictum prompted the
amending of several state statutes, including California's,
to include former reporters.
Farr served 46 days in jail for contempt of court-the
longest sentence any reporter has so far served in the
newsman's privilege cases. His release was finally ordered
by Supreme Court Justice Douglas, writing in chambers
as Circuit justice for the Ninth Circuit. See Farr v.
Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243 (1973). Farr was set free on
personal recognizance, pending disposition of a habeas
corpus action, but that petition was later denied. See In
re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974);
Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976).
Bridge, a reporter with the Newark News, spent 20
days in jail after he refused to answer a grand jury's
questions about a bribe offer reportedly made to a state
official. In his story about the incident, Bridge had named
his news source, but had not revealed the identity of the
person who had attempted to make the bribe. Bridge
claimed the protection of the New Jersey shield law, but
a superior court judge ruled he had waived the privilege
by disclosing his source and some of the details in the
story itself. A New Jersey appellate court and the U.S.
Supreme Court both refused to stay his contempt sen-
tence. See In re Bridge, 120 NJ. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3
(App. Div. 1972), cerl. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
Ironically, it was this incident and the Supreme
Court's Branzburg decision in 1972 that led the NewJersey
legislature to revise and substantially strengthen that
state's shield law. See note 209 infia. The new privilege
statute, said to be "one of the most strongly expressed in
the country," by a justice writing in In re Farber, 78 NJ.
at -, 394 A.2d at 351, was the law that Myron Farber
relied upon when he attempted to contest the contempt
charges against him. That protection, as the New Jersey
Supreme Court's ruling demonstrated, was insufficient.
Other recent cases that demonstrate this tendency
toward strict construction of shield laws include: Ham-
marley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 608 (1979) (privilege must yield to defendant's
right to fair trial in murder prosecution); Rosato v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (shield law limited
by court's ability to restrict prejudicial pretrial publicity);
People v. Gillings, No. 27492 & 27490 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San
Joaquin Cty., March 24, 1976) (reported in Goodale,
Subpoenas, in PRAcricINo LAw INsr: COMMUNICATbONs LAw
304, (1978) [hereinafter cited as Goodale] (shield law did
not protect unpublished photographs sought by both
prosecutor and defense in criminal trial); Lightman v.
State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Ct. Spec. App.),
aff'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 951 (1973) (reporter could not claim privilege when
he personally had observed potentially criminal drug
usage because he thus became the source of the infor-
mation); Michigan v. Smith, 4 MED. L. RaP. (BNA) 1753
(Cir. Ct.), leave to appeal denied, 4 MED L. REP. (BNA)
1761 (Mich. 1978) (shield law held to apply only to grand
jury inquiries and not to subpoena duces tecum'directed to
reporter at criminal trial); New York v. LeGrand, 4 MED.
L. REp. (BNA) 1897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 4 MED. L.
REP. (BNA) 2524 (App. Div. 1979) (author of book not
entitled to shield law protection of his. confidential
sources); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400
N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (reporter bears burden of
proof before grand jury of demonstrating that he has
reached a previous agreement of confidentiality with
news source); People v. Alikili, No. 2897/76 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., N.Y. Cty., 1977) (reported in Goodale, supra at 307)
(television films and video tapes reporting robbery not
protected from subpoena by shield law when no confi-
dential source involved); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d
791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (newspaper
cannot claim privilege where information was not in-
tended to be confidential); People by Fisher v. Dan, 41
App. Div. 2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731, appeal dismissed, 32
N.Y.2d 764, 298 N.E.2d 118, 344 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1973)
(television newscaster and cameraman could not refuse
to answer grand jury questions concerning events they
personally observed during prison riot); In re Dan, 80
Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (news-
caster could not later refuse to testify in criminal trial
that had resulted, in part, from his grand jury testimony);
In re WBAI-FM, 68 Misc. 2d 355, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434
(County Ct. 1971), aff'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d
393 (1973) (radio station could not refuse to turn over
letter that had revealed bombing threat to district attor-
ney); and People v. Wolf, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d
291 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 864, 333
N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972) (reporter could not claim privilege
before grand jury when he had not promised informant
confidentiality in return for information).
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provisions 'concerning witnesses and evidence,46
and several lower courts in New York have ex-
pressed reservations about the constitutionality of
that state's shield.47 This increasingly confined view
on the part of courts and some legislatures' has
persuaded many journalists and news associations
that the best protection would be the enactment
by Congress of a federal shield law. Ninety-nine
proposals for such a law were introduced in the
House or Senate between 1973 and 1978, but none
managed to win congressional passage.4 9 Even if
such a law were enacted, privilege advocates would
have to worry not only about what Congress might
include in the law, but also about how it might
eventually be interpreted by the federal judiciary.
C. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
Newsmen have, in a limited number of circum-
stances involving criminal activities, invoked the
fifth amendment as the justification for their re-
fusal to testify. While this can be viewed in part as
a newsman's privilege argument, it is actually more
Decisions in which journalists' invocation of state
shield laws have been sustained include: United States v.
Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (federal court,
taking note of Pennsylvania statute, said newsman should
not be required to disclose nonconfidential information
in criminal trial where subject matter is irrelevant or
immaterial); In re Foster (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty.,
March 28, 1974) (reported in Goodale, supra at 306)
(contents of letter which were broadcast protected by
statute); People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 478 (1968) (shield law's use sustained in criminal
trial, though not under direct challenge); People v. Bon-
nakemper, 74 Misc. 2d 696, 345 N.Y.S.2d 900 (City Ct.
1973) (trial court quashed subpoena directed to corporate
publisher for published photographs); People v. Dillon,
No. 70-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Ontario Cty., June 25, 1971)
(reported in Goodale, supra at 305 as In re CBS) (trial
court quashed as overbroad special prosecutor's subpoena
for video tapes of campus disturbance).
As this note demonstrates, and as was pointed out in
reference to the common law precedents, note 38 supra,
most shield law privilege cases arise either in the context
of a criminal trial or a grand jury's investigation of
alleged criminal activity. A small number of civil cases
have involved interpretation of state shield laws. They
are discussed at note 112 infra.
46 See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89
N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
47 See New York v. Zagarino, 4 MED. L. RFP. (BNA)
1693 (Sup. Ct. 1978); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850,
370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
4" See, e.g., Comment, Legislation Note: House Bill 1363,
Testimonial Privilege for Newsmen, 9 TULSA L.J. 268 (1973).
49 Figures supplied by the Bill Status Office Committee
on House Adminstration U.S. House of Representatives.
Of the 99 proposals for a federal shield law, 65 were
introduced in the 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., the first session of
Congress to meet after the Branzburg decision.
an example of a journalist, like any other citizen,
relying upon his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. A fifth amendment claim occurs in
a situation where the newsman, because of his
confidential relationship with a source, was a wit-
ness to, or had direct knowledge of, criminal activ-
ity. A person's failure to report a crime which he
has observed or about which he has inside infor-
mation is the crime of misprison ind he can be
subjected to criminal penalties. However, a person
can refuse to testify about what he saw if such
testimony would tend to incriminate him. The
United States Supreme Court upheld this defense
in Burdick v. United States,50 focusing upon protection
of the reporter's fifth amendment right rather than
a newsman's privilege. More recent Supreme Court
cases, however, raise questions about just how
strong a precedent Burdick would be for journalists
today.5'
D. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
In 1958, actress Judy Garland sued the Colum-
bia Broadcasting System for breach of contract
and libel, basing her civil action on statements
allegedly made by an unnamed network executive
and appearing in a story by New York Herald Tribune
gossip columnist Marie Torre. When the enter-
tainer sought, through discovery proceedings, to
learn the name of the executive, Torre refused to
reveal it, and her attorneys responded instead with
a novel argument that would significantly alter the
scope of the newsman's privilege debate.
To compel a newspaper reporter to reveal the
identity of confidential sources, they argued, would
result in an unconstitutional encroachment upon
the first amendment's guarntee of freedom of the
press. This would occur because news sources'
50 236 U.S. 79 (1915). There has been only one reported
case of newsmen relying on the fifth amendment as a
shield in recent years. A Massachusetts editor and re-
porter who were suspected of having obtained informa-
tion from a grand jury leak pleaded both the first and
the fifth amendments in response to a district attorney's
questioning. A judge rejected the first amendment claim,
but said the newsmen would not have to disclose their
sources if it would tend to incriminate them. Grand
Jurors for Middlesex Cty. v. Wallace, No. 111800 (Mass.
Super. Ct., November 21, 1974) (reported in Goodale,
supra note 45, at 310 and Press Censorship Newsletter,
No. VI, December, 1974-January, 1975, at 34), aff'd on
other grounds, 343 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
1976).
5 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972);
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation,
406 U.S. 472 (1972).
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awareness that their identity might later be dis-
closed would result in fewer informants revealing
inside data to reporters and that, in turn, would
lead to an overall reduction in the flow of news
from press to public.
5 2
The argument did not succeed. Torre was held
in criminal contempt for her refusal and the con-
viction was upheld upon appeal by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.5a
Judge Potter Stewart declined to extend any ex-
plicit recognition to a privilege under the first
amendment, though his opinion did make it clear
that freedom of the press was an important right
deserving some judicial protection:
[Fjreedom of the press, precious and vital though it
is to a free society, is not an absolute. What must be
determined is whether the interest to be served by
compelling the testimony of the witness in the pres-
ent case justifies some impairment of this First
Amendment freedom ....
If... freedom of the press ... is here involved, we
do not hesitate to conclude that it ... must give
place under the Constitution to a paramount public
interest in the fair administration ofjustice.54
Judge Stewart noted that this was not a case where
the judicial process was being used to force whole-
sale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential.
sources, nor was the news 'source's identity of
doubtful relevance or materiality: "The question
asked of the appellant went to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim. ' 'O
Miss Torre still would not testify, choosing in-
stead to spend ten days in jail for contempt. Judy
Garland, unable to learn the identity of the un-
named network executive, eventually dropped her
libel suit.56
The specific facts of the Garland litigation and
the language of Judge Stewart's narrowly drawn
opinion were seen initially as hopeful signs by
many privilege advocates. They believed that the
first amendment might provide a more substantial
foundation for successful claims of protection in
future cases. But that early optimism was not well
founded. Following the lead of Garland v. Tore,
courts throughout the 1960's would pay brief hom-
52 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545,547-48 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
259 F.2d at 551.
4 Id. at 548-49.
5 Id. at 550.
'See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1978, § A, at 14, col. 3 (city
ed.).
age to the first amendment-and then would pro-
ceed to rule that it provided newsmen no privi-
lege. 7
On three different occasions prior to Branzburg,
litigants sought Supreme Court review of lower
court decisions that held against a first amendment
newsman's privilege. In each instance, they were
unsuccessful.58 In 1970 however, in the widely pub-
licized case of Caldwell v. United Statesas the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York Times
reporter Earl Caldwell not only had a privilege not
to reveal confidential information, but indeed
could not even be required to appear before a
federal grand jury when the government had
proven no compelling need for his testimony and
a lower federal court already had granted him a
limited testimonial privilege.60 The surprising Cald-
welljudment, the first court decision to ever accept
6 A decision which both followed the Garland principle
and, at the same time, discussed the various other cases
that had subscribed to the "no privilege" approach was
State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
An underground newspaper editor refused to answer
grand jury questions concerning his sources for a story on
a bombing at the University of Wisconsin. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, after a "weighing of competing values,"
held the editor must testify because of the public's right
to protect itself against physical harm. Id. at 657, 183
N.W.2d at 99.
The post-Garland cases mentioned in Knops that re-
jected any first amendment privilege included: State v.
Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392
U.S. 905 (1968) (a campus newspaper editor refused to
answer grand jury questions concerning sources for story
on drug usage); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181
(1963) (editors refused to answer grand jury questions or
produce documents concerning alleged criminal activities
of an ex-city official. The editors' first amendment privi-
lege argument, the court said, was "devoid of merit." Id.
at 40, 193 A.2d at 184); and In re Goodfader, 45 Haw.
317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961) (a photographer, who was not
a party to a civil action, refused to answer deposition
questions about confidential sources).
"a See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Murphy v. Colorado, No.
19604 (Colo.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (discussed
in In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 366, 367 P.2d 472, 498
(Mizuha, J., dissenting)); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or.
244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
59434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Earl Caldwell was a
black reporter covering the activities of the radical Black
Panther Party. He not only refused to answer a grand
jury's questions, but also refused to even attend the grand
jury's secret sessions, arguing that his mere appearance
there would harm his confidential relationship with the
Black Panthers and make it impossible for him to fulfill
his first amendment responsibilities as a journalist.
O'See Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D.
Cal. 1970).
a first amendment privilege claim, was clearly at
odds, not only with precedent, but also with three
other major privilege cases, all decided at about
the same time and all involving grand jury ap-
pearances by reporters. st On May 3, 1971, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in all four
cases.&
2
E. BRANZBURG V. HAYES
In Branzburg v. Hayes the High Court, in a five-
to-four decision written by Mr. Justice White, held
that requiring newsmen to appear and testify be-
fore state or federal grand juries did not abridge
the first amendment freedom of the press.63 The
Court held that reporters have the same obligation
as any other citizen to respond to grand jury
subpoenas and to answer questions relevant to
investigations into criminal activity.6 4 The Court
also decided that the first amendment does not
give rise to any testimonial privilege, either abso-
lute or qualified, that would protect a newsman's
agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his
news sources, or incriminating evidence against
them.65 The Caldwell decision was reversed by the
Supreme Court, while the other three lower court
judgments were upheld.6 6
All three of the newsmen involved, Paul Branz-
burg, Paul Pappas, and Earl Caldwell, had argued
a position not unlike that raised by Marie Torre.
They said that, in the course of gathering news, it
61 The other three cases incorporated in the Branzburg
decision all involved rulings that denied the newsmen's
claims to first amendment privilege. As mentioned in
note 45 supra, Paul Branzburg was a reporter who wrote
two series of stories, at differing times, about drug usage
in Louisville and Frankfort, Ky. Each of these series
resulted in subpoenas from grand juries in those com-
munities. Branzburg refused to answer questions from
either body about the identities of persons he had seen in
possession of drugs, claiming privilege under both state
law and the first amendment. See Branzburg v. Pound,
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503
S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 197 1), aff'dsub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
The final case involved Paul Pappas, a Massachusetts
television newscaster who had spent several hours inside
a local Black Panther headquarters and then refused to
answer a grand jury's questions about what he had seen
there. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
rejected Pappas's first amendment defense. See In re Pap-
pas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), aff dsub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
62 See 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
63 408 U.S. at 667.
6'Id. at 690-91.
6
" Id. at 692.
6 Id. at 708-09.
is often necessary for a reporter to promise either
not to identify his sources or not to reveal in print
everything he knows about a subject. If a reporter
is compelled to reveal this information to a grand
jury, confidential sources will be deterred from
furnishing further information and the free flow of
news, protected by the first amendment, will be
diminished.6 7
Justice White's response to this argument did
admit one small victory for the fourth estate-he
conceded that the seeking out and gathering of
news was entitled to "some" first amendment pro-
tection. He said that without such protection free-
dom of the press could be "eviscerated."6 But,
Justice White went on to say:
It is clear that the First Amendment does not in-
validate every incidental burdening of the press that
may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal
statutes of general applicability.
Fair and effective law enforcement ... is a funda-
mental function of government, and the grand jury
plays an important, constitutionally mandated role
in this process .... [W]e perceive no basis for hold-
ing that the public interest in law enforcement and
in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is in-
sufficient to override the consequential, but uncer-
tain, burden on news gathering that is said to result
from insisting that reporters, like other citizens,
respond to relevant questions put to them in the
course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal
trial. 69
67 Id. at 679-80.
0 Id. at 681.
69 408 U.S. at 682,690-91 (emphasis added). Although
all the Branzburg cases developed in the context of grand
jury investigations, these final, additional words of dic-
tum make it clear how Justice White views the issue of
privilege claims in relation to criminal trials also.
As part of their argument before the Supreme Court,
privilege proponents attempted to demonstrate that the
burden upon newsgathering caused by the uncertainty of
confidentiality was indeed a real and statistically prova-
ble impediment. The empirical studies cited for this
proposition included Guest & Stanzler, note 22 supra;
Blasi, note 21 supra; and Blasi, Press Subpoenas: An
Empirical and Legal Analysis, Study Report of the Re-
porters' Committee on Freedom of the Press (1972).
Justice White's response to these studies was:
[Wie remain unclear how often and to what extent
informers are actually deterred from furnishing in-
formation when newsmen are forced to testify before
a grand jury. The available data indicate that some
newsmen rely a great deal on confidential sources
and that informants are particularly sensitive to the
threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is held
by this Court that ... newsmen must testify pur-
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The fifth and deciding vote in the Branmburg
decisions was added by Justice Powell, who, in a
brief concurrence, emphasized what he saw as "the
limited nature of the Court's holding."70 Justice
Powell urged a balancing approach to the issue.
He echoed Justice White's promise that harassment
of the press wvould not be tolerated and he said that
a reporter who was called on to give information
bearing only a remote relationship to the subject
of investigation, or who had other reason to believe
"his testimony implicates confidential relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement"
could seek a protective order of court through a
motion to quash.71 He concluded:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on
its facts by the striking of a proper balance between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional
and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords
with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating
such questions. 7
In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, urged recognition of a
suant to subpoenas, but the evidence fails to dem-
onstrate that there would be a significant constric-
tion of the flow of news to the public if this Court
reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional
rule regarding the testimonial obligations of news- -
men. Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such sub-
poenas on the willingness of informants to make
disclosure to newsmen are widely divergent and to
a great extent speculative. It would be difficult to
canvass the views of the informants themselves;
surveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinions
of predicted informant behavior and must be viewed
in the light of the professional self-interest of the
interviewees.
408 U.S. at 693-94.
Justice Stewart, in dissent, sharply criticized the ma-
jority opinion on this point: "We have never before
demanded that First Amendment rights rest on elaborate
empirical studies demonstrating beyond any conceivable
doubt that deterrent effects exist .... " It. at 733 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Se Murasky, The Journalists' Privilege:
Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 Tax. L. REV. 829 (1974),
and Comment, The Newsmen's Privilege After Branzburg: The
Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.LA. L. REV. 160,
173-74 (1976), for an argument that the Supreme Court
relied too heavily on a quantitative rather than qualita-
tive analysis and ignored the large number of "impor-
tant" stories, such as the Washington Post's Watergate
expose's, that Would not be uncovered and published
without the aid of confidential sources.
70 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
7'1d. at 710.
72 Id. (footnote omitted).
conditional privilege for newsmen 73 This recogni-
tion would entail shifting the burden of proving
whether the privilege applied in a particular case.
Instead of the journalist attempting to convince a
court that he should be granted a testimonial
privilege, the initial responsibility would fall upon
the government to demonstrate why the reporter
should not be permitted to invoke that protection.74
To meet this burden, Justice Stewart said the
government should be required to prevail on a
three-part test. It should have to
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that
the newsman has information that is clearly relevant
to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demon-
strate that the information sought cannot be ob-
tained by alternative means less destructive of first
amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compel-
ling and overriding interest in the information.'
Justice Douglas, who focused his dissent on the
Caldwell case, specifically proclaimed his view that
a reporter has an absolute right under the first
amendment to refuse to appear or testify before a
grand jury.78 Indeed, the Justice upbraided the
New York Times for urging only a conditional priv-
ilege in its arguments before the Court; this "timid,
watered-down, emasculated version of the First
Amendment" which the Times offered was at odds
with the Justice's view of the first amendment as
an absolute.7
F.'THE POST-BRANZBURG PRIVILEGE
Today, more than seven years after the Branzburg
decision, trial and appellate courts and legal com-
mentators are still attempting to decide just what
the Court's opinion actually meant. Limited to its
facts, of course, the holding required Earl Caldwell,
Paul Branzburg, and Paul Pappas to appear and
testify before grand juries, although none ever
actually did so.78 On the general question of news-
man's privilege however, the holding was not so
a Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 739-43.
75 Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
7 Id. at 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
7 Id.
' The grand juries in the Caldwell and Pappas investi-
gations were never reconvened to hear testimony. By the
time the Supreme Court's decision was announced,
Branzburg had left the Courier-Journal and was working
as a journalist in Michigan. A Kentucky court held him
in contempt in absentia, but Michigan would not extradite
him. See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing
Qualified Privilegefor Newsmen, 26 HAsTINGS LJ. 709, 719
(1975).
clear. Four justices said they would not interpret
the first amendment to provide protection,7 9 while
three others dissented in favor of a qualified testi-
monial privilege to be granted or denied through
the application of a three-part balancing test.8 ° A
fourth Justice also urged a privilege; indeed, he
believed in absolute immunity for journalists."'
That left the deciding vote with justice Powell,
and though he agreed that these three particular
reporters ought to be required to testify, his con-
cluding statement suggesting that "vital constitu-
tional and societal interests [ought to be balanced]
on a case-by-case basis" strongly implied that he,
too, was willing to acknowledge a conditional priv-
ilege. 2 justice Powell's own analysis of Branzburg,
expressed two years later in his dissenting opinion
in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,83 tends to substanti-
ate this interpretation. In fact, the justice went so
far as to suggest that "a fair reading" of the Branz-
burg plurality opinion made it clear that "the result
hinged on an assessment of the competing societal
interests involved ... rather than on any determi-
nation that First Amendment freedoms were not
implicated."8 4
The primary concern of this comment is appli-
cations of newsman's privilege to criminal law.
'9 408 U.S. at 690.80 Id. at 725, 728, 743.
8' Id. at 713.
2Id. at 710.
83 417 U.S. 843, 859 (1974).
84 Id. at 859-60. But before being too quick to read
Justice Powell's case-by-case balancing test into the
Branzburg plurality opinion, recall Justice White's words:
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a
long and difficult journey to such an uncertain
destination. The administration of a constitutional
newsman's privilege would present practical and
conceptual difficulties of a high order.
In each instance where a reporter is subpoenaed
to testify, the courts would also be embroiled in
preliminary factual and legal determinations with
respect to whether the proper predicate had been
laid for the reporter's appearance....
... [1in the end, by considering whether enforce-
ment of a particular law served a "compelling"
governmental interest, the courts would be inextric-
ably involved in distinguishing between the value
of enforcing different criminal laws. By requiring
testimony from a reporter in investigations involv-
ing some crimes, but not in others, they would be
making a value judgment that a legislature had
declined to make .... The task ofjudges, like other
officials outside the legislative branch, is not to
make the law, but to uphold it....
408 U.S. at 703-06.
Much of the post-Branzburg privilege litigation,
however, has been civil. For that reason, a brief
examination of recent cases dealing with civil ac-
tions is necessary in order to better understand
trends in this field.
1. Civil Actions
A conditional privilege appears to be developing
in the area of civil litigation, drawing support more
from the limiting language of Branzburg than from
the holding itself. Courts deciding civil actions
have repeatedly pointed to both justice White's
and Justice Powell's emphasis on the limited nature
of the Branzburg decision.aS Justice Powell's appar-
ent endorsement of a balancing approach is also
cited,8 6 along with the Garland judgment.8 7 These
two cases, neither of which granted a privilege on
their specific facts, are thus employed now to sanc-
tion its creation.
Even though courts have generally acknowl-
edged the existence of a conditional civil privilege,
the extent to which they allow its assertion depends
upon the nature of the claim. Many of the civil
suits brought in the wake of Branzburg have been
actions for libel. In such cases, the Garland standard
is generally applied and privilege claims are re-
jected when the identity of the sources goes to the
"heart of the claim." When newsmen are not actual
parties to the litigation, however, courts are much
more reluctant to require disclosure.
8 8
Three post-Branzburg cases involving conflicting
defamation and privilege claims have been decided
by federal circuit courts of appeal. 4 One of the
decisions, Herbert v. Lando, was reversed last term
by the Supreme Court,90 but the Court's holding
85 See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 634-36 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Baker v. F & F
Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 966 (1973); Rancho La Costa v. Penthouse, 4 MED.
L. REP. (BNA) 1564, 1566 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1978).
86 See, e.g., 492 F.2d at 634-36, 470 F.2d at 783-84.87 See, e.g., 492 F.2d at 634-36, 470 F.2d at 783-84.
m
t See notes 105, 107, 109 & 112 & accompanying text
infra
'3 See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977),
rev'd,-U.S.-, 99 S.Ct 1635 (1979); Carey v. Hume, 492
F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
90 -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979). Col. Anthony Her-
bert was a U.S. Army officer who gained national prom-
inence during the latter stages of the Vietnam War when
he charged several of his superior officers with concealing
war atrocities. Barry Lando was a producer for CBS's
documentary news program, "60 Minutes," who became
interested in the Herbert story. He investigated several
inconsistencies in Herbert's story and this research re-
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in Herbert should not be viewed as having rendered
a major change in the law of privilege claims in
libel actions. The 1977 Second Circuit decision
which the Supreme Court reversed in Herbert had
attempted to extend the first amendment privilege
well beyond the bounds of previous cases to encom-
pass protection of ajournalist's "thoughts, opinions
and conclusions" during the editorial process. The
plaintiff in the case, a controversial ex-Army offi-
cer, had not attempted to discover the identity of
news sources or force disclosure of confidential
information. Instead, through pretrial discovery,
he sought to learn the defendant's "state of mind"
during the production and editing of an allegedly
libelous television program. The plaintiff con-
tended he needed this information in order to
establish "actual malice"-the standard for recov-
ery demanded under New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.9' The Second Circuit opinion noted that the
defendant broadcaster already had submitted to
an extensive deposition, which revealed everything
he "knew, saw, said and wrote during his investi-
gation."'  To require more would be to "strike to
the heart of the vital human component of the
editorial process" and would result in journalists
being "chilled in the very process of thought. ' "s
Writing for a six-to-three majority, Justice White
found that argument unpersuasive. He conceded
suited in a national telecast that raised doubts about
Herbert's veracity. Herbert then brought a $45 million
defamation action against Lando, CBS, and others. Her-
bert's deposition of Lando filled 2,903 pages, produced
240 exhibits, and required 26 sessions over a period of a
year. In the deposition, Herbert inquired about what
Lando knew, whom he had interviewed, and the fre-
quency of his communications with his sources. The
plaintiff also wanted to know about the producer's beliefs,
opinions, intent, and conclusions in preparing the pro-
gram. Lando refused to answer only a few of these
questions-those dealing with his thoughts and conclu-
sions during his research, and his "state of mind" con-
cerning the veracity of the persons he had interviewed.
The Second Circuit felt that if malice was involved under
the New York Times rule, note 91 infra, Herbert ought to
be capable of proving it through the use of the massive
transcript he already had compiled.
9' 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Herbert and Cervantes cases
both involved "public figures" and, under the rules
spawned by the New York Times case and its progeny, a
public figure must meet a higher standard of proof in
order to win his case. The public figure must demonstrate
that the falsehood was published with actual malice or in
reckless disregard of the truth. This standard may argu-
ably provide courts with a greater justification for order-
ing disclosure, though the Eighth Circuit did not choose
to do so in Cervantes.
9,2 568 F.2d at 984.
93 id.
that the ediftorial process is entitled to some first
amendment protection and said it could not be
subjected to "private or official examination
merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general
end such as the public interest." 94 But where there
is a "specific claim of injury arising from a publi-
cation that is alleged to have been knowing or
recklessly false,"95 no constitutional barrier exists.
To hold otherwise, the Justice concluded, would be
to "erect an impenetrable barrier" to a plaintiff's
use of the sort of direct evidence most relevant to
establishing "the ingredients of malice required by
New York Times.
'96
Turning to the more traditional type of privilege
assertion in defamation cases, the 1974 decision in
Carey v. Hume97 enunciated what continues to be
the general rule. In Carey, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia eschewed the
defendants' claim that journalists could never be
compelled to reveal their sources and opted instead
for a case-by-case balancing test. Noting that the
differences between civil and criminal proceedings
distinguished Branzburg from the action before the
court, Judge McGowan pointed to Justice Powell's
9 -U.S. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1648.
95Id.
96 -U.S. at -,99 S.Ct. at 1646.
9 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974). This case involved a libel action brought by the
general counsel of the United Mine Workers union
against political columnist Jack Anderson and one 'of his
associate writers. Anderson had relied on the observations
of confidential sources in writing a story that charged the
plaintiff with taking documents from the union's head-
quarters in order to thwart a government investigation
into union financial affairs.
The Garland and Carey standard also was applied to
another case in which columnist Anderson was involved,
this time as a plaintiff. Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp.
1195 (D.D.C. 1978). Anderson was seeking damages and
charging that a conspiracy led by former President Nixon
had intended to deprive him of his rights as a journalist.
During a pretrial deposition, Anderson refused to identify
some of his confidential sources. In resolving the issue,
Judge Gerhard Gesell began by describing the newsman's
privilege as a" 'fundamental personal right' well founded
in the First Amendment"-perhaps the most sweeping
language yet used by ajurist in considering the issue. 444
F. Supp. at 1198. The judge went on to say, however,
that the protection was qualified:
The qualified privilege ofthe newsman is a fragile
one.... Where, as here, it is the newsman himself
who has provoked the legal controversy about which
his confidential sources may have relevant infor-
mation, any "balancing" seems most unrealistic.
Having chosen to become a litigant, the newsman
is not exempt from those obligations imposed ... on
all litigants in the federal courts.
444 F. Supp. at 1199.
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opinion, which he considered controlling in Branz-
burg, and then continued:
Branzburg, in language if not in holding, left intact,
insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the approach
taken in Garland. That approach essentially is that
the court will look to the facts on a case-by-case
basis in the course of weighing the need for the
testimony in question against the claims of the
newsman that the public's right to know is im-
paired.98
The court added the Garland "heart of the claim"
test and a requirement that libel plaintiffs first
make a reasonable attempt to exhaust alternative
sources of information before seeking disclosure
from the newsman-though such attempts did not
have to be "wide ranging and onerous" when the
number of potential sources was "very substan-
tial."'  Applying those standards to the libel claim
before it, the court concluded that the identity of
the newsmen's sources was critical to the plaintiff's
claim.
It does not follow, however, that disclosure is
foreordained in all defamation cases. 10° In Cervantes
98 492 F.2d at 636.
99 Id. at 638-39.
'0 Three recent state and federal lower court decisions
held that the plaintiff in a libel action had failed to meet
the "heart of the claim" and "exhaustion of alternative
sources" tests outlined in Carey. See Schultz v. Reader's
Digest, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2356 (E.D. Mich. 1979);
Hart v. Playboy Enterprises, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1616
(D. Kan. 1978); Rancho La Costa v. Penthouse, 4 MEo.
L. REP. (BNA) 1564 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1978). But see
Goldfeld v. Post Publishing, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1167
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1978), in which disclosure was ordered
because the court held the plaintiff had met the tests
successfully. Also, in two bench rulings, Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., No. 75-1827
(D.D.C. July 29, 1976), and Buchanan v. Cronkite, No.
1087-73 (D.D.C.July 3, 1974) (both reported in Goodale,
supra note 45, at 330, 334),judges ruled that disclosure of
confidential sources would be ordered only if libel plain-
tiffs established relevancy and exhaustion of alternative
sources. Summary judgment in the Martin Marietta case is
reported at 417 F. Supp 947, aff'd per curiam, No. 76-1932
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
Utilizing a different approach, a federal court and a
state court have applied state shield laws to deny a libel
plaintiff's motions for disclosure of confidential sources
or broadcast "outtakes." See Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner,
4 MEo. L. REP. (BNA) 1655 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Saxton v.
Arkansas Gazette Co.,-Ark.-, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).
While several federal and state courts seem to be
acknowledging the existence of a conditional newsman's
privilege in defamation cases, it bears mention that two
state supreme courts have ruled in libel actions that no
such protection, either absolute or qualified, is sanctioned
by the first amendment. The Massachusetts Supreme
v. Time, Inc., t decided just three weeks after Branz-
burg, the Eighth Circuit said it would not routinely
grant motions for compulsory revelation of confi-
dential sources "without first inquiring into the
substance of the libel allegation." °2 Looking at the
facts before it, the court said the plaintiff had
produced "little more than a series of self-serving
affidavits" to support his claim."t ° The court con-
cluded that to compel disclosure when a defama-
tion plaintiff "has not produced a scintilla of
proof" would constitute precisely the unjustifiable
harassment of the press which Justice Powell had
warned against in Branzburg. 10
4
In three other civil cases decided by federal
circuit courts of appeal, journalists were not ac-
tually parties to the litigation and the courts ac-
Judicial Court, in Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court,
364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973), and the Supreme
Court of Idaho in Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98
Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977),
in factual situations not dissimilar from that of Carey,
ruled that reporters must reveal their sources. The Mas-
sachusetts court cited Branzburg and Garland and distin-
guished Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). See note 105 & accom-
panying text infra. The Idaho court cited not only Branz-
burg and Garland, but Carey and Dou, Jones as well for its
conclusion. But see the spirited dissents of Justices Don-
aldson and Bakes, 98 Idaho at 298, 562 P.2d at 801-12,
both of whom distinguished Branzburg and Garland along
the same lines followed by many federal courts. A lower
Idaho court recently followed Caldero in imposing a $1.9
million libel judgment against a newspaper ihat refused
to reveal confidential information after the court ordered
its disclosure. See Sierra Life Ins. v. Magic Valley News-
papers, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1689 (Idaho Dist. Ct.
1977h.
After the New Mexico Supreme Court had struck
down its state's shield law as unconstitutional (see note
46 supra), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico, in a
subsequent case stemming from the same cause of action,
ruled that the first amendment also provided no privilege,
either absolute or qualified, in defamation actions. The
court cited DowJones and Carey in reaching its conclusion.
See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M.
250, 572 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 249,
572 N.M. 1257 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
Two reported trial rulings that held against privilege
claims in defamation actions were Linsey v. Kelman, No.
15,396 (D. Conn. March 19, 1975), and Dunn v. Morkap
Publishing Co., No. 7250 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1974) (both
reported in Goodale, supra note 45, at 331-33).
10 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972). In this case, the mayor
of St. Louis sued the publisher and a reporter for Life
magazine after Life printed a story linking the mayor
with organized crime.
'02 Id. at 993.
13 Id. at 994.
1o4 Id. at 994-95 & n.12.
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cordingly established a higher standard for disclo-
sure. In Baker v. F & F Investment,s the Second
Circuit recognized a public interest in a reporter
not being forced to reveal his sources and then held
that, in this particular case, that public interest
outweighed the public and private interest in com-
pelled testimony. The Baker court ruled that the
plaintiffs had not shown that they had exhausted
'05470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), ter. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973). This case involved a civil rights class action
brought on behalf of black home buyers against real
estate agents who were alleged to have discriminated in
their sales practices. The journalist who was deposed by
the plaintiffs had written a story based on an interview
with one real estate agent, but the information was given
only after the reporter promised confidentiality. The
reporter made it apparent during his deposition that he
was sympathetic to the plaintiffs' cause, but he would not
reveal his source.
Several cases on the federal and state levels have cited
Baker for the proposition that newsmen are entitled to a
qualified privilege and should not be required to disclose
confidential sources when they are not parties to the civil
litigation being contested. In Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973), a civil
action arising out of the Watergate burglaries, represent-
atives of President Nixon's Committee for the Re-Elec-
tion of the President subpoenaed a large number of
journalists from several major newspapers and news-
magazines for depositions and to obtain all of their notes,
photographs, and tapes relating to the break-ins. In
quashing the subpoenas, the court distinguished Branzburg
as a criminal case, said the plaintiffs had not met the
Garland "heart of the claim" test, and cited Baker as
precedent for a qualified privilege.
Cases that have since adopted either the Baker or
McCord standards or both explicitly include: Poirier v.
Carson, 537 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1976) (no disclosure of
source); Gulliver's Periodicals Ltd. v. Charles Levy Cir-
culating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Il. 1978) (no
disclosure ofsource or information); Citicorp v. Interbank
Card Ass'n, 4 MED L. REP. (BNA) 1429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(no disclosure of source); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Build-
ing & Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (no disclosure of unpublished information);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
(no disclosure of published or unpublished information);
Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (no disclosure of source or information);
Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 33
Conn. Supp. 204, 370 A.2d 1095 (Super. Ct. 1976) (no
disclosure of source); Spiva v. Francouer, 39 Fla. Supp.
49 (Cir. Ct. 1973) (no disclosure of source or information);
Opinion of the Justices, 2 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2083
(N.H. Sup. Ct. 1977) (no disclosure of sources); MacKay
v. Driscoll, 3 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) (no disclosure of information); and Dallas Oil &
Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70 (rex. Ct. Civ. App.
1976) (no disclosure of source). For a decision contra
which adopted Baker/McCord standards and still re-
quircd disclosure, see Winegard v. Oxberger, -Iowa-,
258 N.W.2d 847 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
alternative sources of information to learn the
name of a confidential news source, nor had they
demonstrated that the source's identity went to the
heart of their claim.
6
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,10 7 the Tenth Cir-
cuit extended Baker protection to an independent
producer preparing a documentary film, ruling
that one did not have to be a reporter on a news-
paper to qualify for a journalist's privilege.ls
The 1975 contempt convictions of two West
Virginia reporters were first overturned, then later
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Steelhammer,'° though the court vacated the jour-
nalists' unserved sentence of six months in jail. The
decision grew out of a civil contempt hearing held
to determine whether members of a coal miners'
union had violated a court order prohibiting wild-
cat strikes. Two reporters for the Charleston Gazette
were held in contempt of court for refusing to
testify about what they had seen or heard at a
union rally. The convictions were initially reversed
by the appellate court on the ground that the
information could have been obtained from other
persons who-had attended the rally," 0 but on a
rehearing en banc, the contempt judgments were
reinstated by a four-to-three vote. The full court
adopted the reasoning of the dissenting judge in
the-earlier case, who said that since the reporters
admitted their information came not from confi-
dential sources, but from an open meeting, they
should be required to testify. The judge said he
reached this conclusion by applying Justice Pow-
eli's Branzburg balancing test."'
In all, twenty-eight reported post-Branzburg civil
cases in which information was sought from a
nonlitigant journalist have been decided in the
state and federal courts." 2 In only three cases were
'6 470 F.2d at 783. Interestingly, the Baker court,
reaching its decision just a few months after Branzburg,
said that federal law did not recognize either an absolute
or conditional newsman's privilege, id. at 781, but that
same Second Circuit, in deciding Herbert v. Lando five
years later, cited both Branzburg and Baker in its accept-
ance of a conditional protection for the press. See 568
F.2d at 977-78, 986.
107 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
'8Id. at 436-37.
'o"539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976), aFfden bane, 561 F.2d
539 (4th Cir. 1977).
"o 539 F.2d at 375.
". Id. at 376.
"
2 Sixteen of these cases are discussed in notes 105, 107
& 109 supra. Twelve other civil cases have not utilized the
Baker/MeCord standards in dealing with subpoenas di-
rected to journalists who were not parties to the litigation.
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the reporters required to testify. In addition to the
Steelhammer decision, a second case involved an
interpretation of a state shield law, with an Ohio
court holding that sources were protected, but
confidential information was not. t" 3 The third case,
decided by the Iowa Supreme Court, resulted
in an order to a reporter to reveal both her news
source and confidential information." 4 Although
the court said it was "persuaded there exists a
fundamental newsperson privilege,"" 5 it con-
cluded that the plaintiff had shown "an undiluted
compelling state interest of such persuasive force as
to subordinate" the privilege.1 1 The plaintiff had
brought a defamation and invasion of privacy
Concern for a "chilling effect" on the first amendment
interests involved was the reason given in three cases for
quashing subpoenas. See Coira v. Depoo Hosp., 4 MED.
L. REp. (BNA) 1692 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978) (no disclosure of
published or unpublished information); Hendrix v. Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 75-1616 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11,
1975) (no disclosure of nonconfidential information);
Schwartz v. Almart Stores, No. 74-35547 (Fla. Cir. Ct.,
June 18, 1975) (both reported in Goodale, supra note 45,
at 321-22) (no disclosure of information, whether or not
from confidential source); Amato v. Fellner, 4 MED. L.
REP. (BNA) 1552 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978) (also citing state
constitution for nondisclosure of information sought).
Carey v. Hume, a defamation case, see note 97 and
accompanying text supra, was cited as authority for the
quashing of subpoenas in two nondefamation cases. See
In re Consumers Union, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2119
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no disclosure of information); Gilbert
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(no disclosure of confidential sources).
State shield laws were relied upon successfully by
nonparty newsmen in four cases. See Dumez v. Hauma
Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341 So. 2d 1206 (La.
Ct. App. 1976) (no disclosure of source); Davis v. Davis,
88 Misc. 2d 1, 386 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Fam. Ct. 1976) (no
disclosure of information); Greenwood Village, Inc. v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan, Bankruptcy No. 73-996 (N.D.
Ohio, Feb. 2, 1976) (no disclosure ofsources), and Taylor
v. Tennessee Democratic Executive Comm., No. 79507-1
R.D. (Tenn. Chancery Ct., Mem. Opinion June 24, 1975)
(no disclosure ofsources) (both reported in Goodale, supra
note 45, at 323, 327). But see Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City
of Heath, 37 Ohio Misc. 30,302 N.E.2d 593 (Ct. Common
Pleas 1973) (shield law protected only sources and not
information).
In another case, In re Nomination Paper of Tracy, No.
75-8108-01-6 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas Sept. 3, 1975) (re-
ported in Goodale, supra note 45, at 322.), the court
quashed a subpoena that would have required disclosure
of confidential sources, but no opinion was issued.
113 See Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 302
N.E.2d 593 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1973).
14 See Winegard v. Oxberger, -Iowa-, 258 N.W.2d
847 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
's-Iowa at -, 258 N.W.2d at 850.
"
6 Id. at -, 258 N.W.2d at 852.
action against an attorney who had provided a
reporter with facts from which she had written a
story about the plaintiff. Since the reporter was the
only witness to what the lawyer had actually said,
the Iowa court ruled the plaintiff had met what it
defined as the three Garland, Baker, and Cervantes
tests: (1) the information was necessary or critical
to the involved cause of action or defense pleaded;
(2) other reasonable means available by which to
obtain the information sought had been exhausted;
and (3) it did not appear from the record that the
action or defense was patently frivolous.
1 17
2. Grand Jury Proceedings
Grand jury proceedings were the context in
which the four Branzburg cases arose and on the
basic question of whether newsmen can be com-
pelled to appear and testify before grand juries,
Branzburg still controls. In the seven years since the
Supreme Court's 1972 decision, at least eleven
federal and state court decisions have been handed
down which cite Branzburg as their authority for




118 Decisions following Branzburg include: In re .Lewis,
501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913
(1975) and Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.
1975) (two cases involving a Los Angeles radio station
general manager who refused to turn over the originals
of tape recordings from various radical groups, including
the Symbionese Liberation Army, concerning bombings
and the Patty Hearst kidnaping, even though he had
provided police with copies of the tapes. In both cases,
the Ninth Circuit ruled the manager had no first amend-
ment right to refuse the grand jury's subpoena duces
tecum); In re McGowan, 298 A.2d 339 (Del. Super. Ct.
1972), rev'don other grounds, -Del.-, 303 A.2d 645 (1973)
(newspaper photographer was ordered to turn over pic-
tures of an antibusing demonstration to state attorney
general's office, the lower court holding that the attorney
general had full investigative powers and was in the same
position as the grand jury in Branzburg); In re Tierney, 328
So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (reporter could not
refuse to testify about source of grand jury "leaks");
Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aff'd,
266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
951 (1973) (neither state shield law, nor the first amend-
ment permitted a reporter to refuse to disclose a news
source's identity to a grand jury investigating drug use;
also discussed at note 45 supra); In re Suffolk County
Grand Jury, (Mass. Super. Ct. 1976) (reported in Good-
ale, supra note 45, at 306) (editors had to turn over
transcript of interview with the mayor of Boston to a
grand jury investigating alleged bribery); Grand Jurors
for Middlesex County v. Wallace, (Mass. Super. Ct., Nov.
21, 1974) (reported in Goodale, supra note 45, at 310),
aff'd on other grounds, 343 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. 1976), (re-
porters could not on first amendment grounds refuse to
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Beyond the basic holding of Branzburg however,
two other problems concerning grand juries and
journalists have emerged to confront the courts.
The first is a direct outgrowth of the Branzburg
position. Assuming that the first amendment does
not free a newsman from his responsibility to ap-
pear before a grand jury, to what extent, if any,
might it limit the scope of questioning to which he
is required to respond? Bursey v. United States,119 a
Ninth Circuit decision announced just one day
after Branzburg, provides the most comprehensive
treatment of this issue.
The second problem arises out of the grandjury's
traditional obligation to keep its proceedings secret.
In recent years, "leaks" by insiders to reporters
have occasionally resulted in newspaper stories that
revealed what had occurred during secret grand
jury sessions. Courts have attempted to punish the
persons responsible for these leaks, but to do so, it
usually is necessary to question the newsmen in-
volved and to order disclosure of confidential
testify about the source of a grand jury "leak," although
they could plead the fifth amendment); In re Bridge, 120
NJ. Super. 460,295 A.2d 3 (App. Div.), aff'd, 62 NJ. 80,
299 A.2d 78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973)
(neither state shield law, nor the first amendment per-
mitted a reporter to refuse to answer grand jury questions
on unpublished information from known news source;
also discussed at note 45 supra); People by Fisher v. Dan,
41 App. Div. 2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731, appeal dismissed,
32 N.Y.2d 764, 344 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1973) (neither state
shield law, nor the first amendment permitted newscaster
or cameraman to refuse to answer grand jury questions
concerning their personal observations during a prison
riot, though they were not compelled to identify news
sources; also discussed at note 45 supra); Andrews v.
Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 910, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct.,
400 1977) (discussed at note 45 supra); and In re Powers,
4 Med. L. REP. (BNA) 1600 (Vt. Dist. Ct. 1978) (reporters
could not refuse to testify as to sources and information
before an inquest investigating drug law violations).
But see In re Bensky, Misc. 75-18-OJC (N.D. Cal. April
14, 1975) (reported in Goodale, supra note 45, at 305), in
which a grand jury had subpoenaed a tape recording of
reading by fugitive Weather Undeiground radicals that
had been sent to a California radio station. Responding
to a factual situation substantially similar to that in the
Lewis cases, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) and 501 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1974), a federal court quashed thesubpoena,
holding that, given the nature of the recording, it was
too speculative as to whether the tape would lead to
information about criminal activities.
People v. Dillon, No. 70-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 25,
1971) (Reported in Goodale, supra note 45, at 305 as In re
CBS) was a pre-Branzburg ruling in which ajudge quashed
as overbroad a subpoena for videotapes issued by a
special prosecutor investigating campus disturbances.
19 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
sources. Several reporters and editors have been
held in contempt of court for refusing to identify
their insider sources, but in one instance, a re-
porter's conviction was overturned after the court
applied a balancing test to the case.12°
As to the scope of grand jury questioning, judges
in at least two cases have suggested that the Branz-
burg holding has been augmented by the tests enun-
ciated in Bursey. 2' That case involved two members
of the Black Panther Party, Sherrie Bursey and
Brenda Presley, who also worked as reporters and
editors for the party's national newspaper. They
were called several times to appear before a federal
grand jury that was investigating an alleged threat
on the life of President Nixon and rumored Black
Panther interference with American military
forces. During their grand jury appearances the
government also sought to question Bursey and
Presley about the operation and staff of the party's
newspaper, but they refused to answer. The Ninth
Circuit held that the questions dealing with
threatened violence and the military interference
were legitimate, but ruled the two women could
not be compelled to testify about the publication
and distribution of Black Panther newspapers or
pamphlets because those inquiries violated the first
amendment rights of free association and freedom
of the press.I
22
The Bursey court did not conclude that journal-
ists could never be questioned about their work,
but it did hold that "[w]hen governmental activity
collides with First Amendment rights, the Govern-
ment has the burden of establishing that its inter-
ests are legitimate and compelling and that the
incidental infringement upon First Amendment
rights is no greater than is essential to vindicate its
subordinating interests. 3Is
In the grand jury context, the court said the
government would be unable to meet this burden
unless it demonstrated that:
the Government's interest in the subject matter of
the investigation is "immediate, substantial, and
subordinating," that there is a "substantial connec-
tion" between the information it seeks to have the
witness compelled to supply and the overriding
governmental interest in the subject matter of the
investigation, and that the means of obtaining the
120 See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
12l See United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Leventhal,J., opinion for extending stay); Morgan
v. State, 325 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
'2 466 F.2d at 1086-88.
'23 Id. at 1083.
19791
information is not more drastic than necessary to
forward the asserted governmental interest.' 24
In those cases where newspapers have published
"leaked" reports of grand jury proceedings, courts
normally have ordered disclosure of the confiden-
tial source, though even in this area of conceded
judicial supremacy, judges have evinced some con-
cern for the competing first amendment interest.
In a 1977 case involving the New York Times and
the sealed results of a grand jury's investigation
into the Internal Revenue Service's "Operation
Leprechaun," involving alleged probes by IRS
agents into the drinking and sexual habits of prom-
inent taxpayers, a federal judge, while holding that
"there is no constitutional right to withhold sources
of grand jury leaks," did permit the disclosure to
be made in camera. 12
5
A California appellate court ruled that a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial justified sealing a grand
jury report until after the completion of the trial,
and outweighed a conditional first amendment
privilege which it said was granted by Branzburg
and Farr v. Pitchess.1 26 The court did conclude
however, that under the California shield law, the
newspaper was only obligated to disclose its source
if that person had been directly subject -to the
court's gag order.
127
'24 Id., relying on standards set in Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 551, 557
(1963).
A state court decision which dealt with the scope of
grand jury questioning was In re Tierney, 328 So. 2d 40
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). In that case, the court held
that a journalist could claim a first amendment privilege
to refuse to answer grand jury questions only if she could
demonstrate that the questions were not relevant and
material to a good faith investigation. In Tierney, the
reporter was unable to satisfy that requirement.
,
2 5 See In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Report, 2 MED.
L. REP. (BNA) 1225, 1231, 3 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1161,'
1163 (S.D. Fla. 1977). The benefit of such an in camera
inspection will be analyzed further in the examination of
the Farber case infra.
The New York Times also was involved in a similar
case decided two years before Branzburg in In re Grand
Jury, 315 F. Supp. 681 (D.Md. 1970). The court held
that while it had the power, under the first amendment,
to inquire into the source of a grand jury leak of a sealed
indictment that the Times had published, it did not feel
such an action was warranted in this case because there
was no indication that anyone under the court's direct
authority was responsible for the leak.
'26 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976).
'2, Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124
Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
See also Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99
Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972);
note 45 supra.
The one case that contradicts this general trend
presented a factual situation that will not often be
repeated. After investigating charges of local gov-
ernmental corruption, a Florida grandjury decided
not to hand down any indictments, though its
report did criticize several city officials. Under that
state's law, disclosure of such critical reports is
forbidden until the unindicted persons have had
time to file a motion to repress. A reporter who
wrote a story revealing the grand jury's decision
was found guilty of criminal contempt after she
refused to disclose her source. However, the Florida
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that the persons criticized in the report, who might
not have succeeded in suppressing the document
in any case, were the only ones affected by pre-
mature disclosure. The court concluded that their
interest did not outweigh the conditional privilege
which it detected in Branzburg.'
28
3. Criminal Cases
As in the area of civil litigation, courts in crimi-
nal cases generally seem to be acknowledging the
existence of a conditional or qualified privilege for
the press. Most courts attribute the initial recog-
nition of this privilege to Branzburg,129 although at
least two judges have ruled that Branzburg provides
no foundation for either an absolute or qualified
privilege in criminal cases.130
Admitting the existence of a constitutional news-
man's privilege is one thing; permitting its use in
a specific situation is another. Since Branzburg,
courts have granted immunity to journalists in
fifteen of twenty-seven of the reported criminal
"z Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954-55 (Fla.
1976). The Morgan balancing test was followed in State
ex. re. Bradenton Herald v. Garst, County Judge, No. 76-
223-7F (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1976) (reported in Goodale, supra
note 45, at 311).
'2' Decisions that have cited Branzburg as the source for
recognition of a qualified privilege in criminal cases
include: Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v.
Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
without opinion, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 997 (1977); State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 576,
581 P.2d 812, 814 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1265
(1979); People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 642, 368
N.Y.S.2d 685, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975); State v. St. Peter, 132
Vt. 266, 269-70, 315 A.2d 254, 255 (1974); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis.
2d 601, 619, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287 (1978).
10 See People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 795, 388
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Sup. Ct. 1976); People v. Mon-
roe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 854, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007,.1011 (Sup.
Ct. 1975).
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cases in which it was sought; disclosure has been
ordered in only nine of the cases.' 3 ' No single
clearly enunciated test has emerged from the opin-
ions, though the issues of "relevancy" and "mate-
131 Those reported criminal cases in which courts have
accepted first amendment claims of newsman's privilege
through early 1979 are: United States v. Pretzinger, 542
F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976) (news source's identity sought
by defendant); United States v. DePalma, 4 MED. L.
REP. (BNA) 2499 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) '(defendant's motion
for mistrial denied and subpoena to learn source of
magazine photograph used as trial exhibit quashed);
United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), afl'd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) (news source's identity sought
by defendant); United States v. Calvert, No. 74-107 CR
(E.D.Mo. Apr. 26, 1974) (reported in Goodale, supra note
45, at 308) (news source's identity sought by defendant);
Laughlin v. State, 323 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (news source's identity sought by defendant); Flor-
ida v. Morel, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2309 (Cir. Ct. 1979)
(published and unpublished information sought by de-
fendant); Florida v. Beattie, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2150
(Cir. Ct. 1979) (videotape of broadcast and unpublished
information sought by defendant); Florida v. Petrantoni,
4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1554 (Cir. Ct.1978) (published
and unpublished information sought by defendant); Flor-
ida v. Hurston, 3 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2295 (Cir. Ct.
1978) (taped interviews with defendant sought by prose-
cution); State v. Stoney, 42 Fla. Supp. 194 (Cir. Ct. 1974)
(unpublished information sought by defendant for im-
peachment purposes); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d
850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (reporters' notes
and television tapes sought by defendants); People v.
Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 685 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (news source's identity and confidential informa-
tion sought by defendant); People v. Barnes, Indict. No.
3194/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. 1975) (reported in
Goodale, supra note 45, at 318) (unpublished information
sought by defendant for impeachment purposes); Brown
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974) (news source's identity sought
by defendants); and Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601,
266 N.W.2d 279 (1978) (news source's identity sought by
defendant). -
Reported criminal cases in which courts have rejected
first amendment privilege claims (not including the Farber
case) are: Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975)
(news source's identity sought by court policing its own
proceedings); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208
(D.D.C.), affd, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (tape of
interview with news source sought by defendants); State
v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (1978), cert.
denied, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 1265 (1979) (news source's
identity sought by defendant); Michigan v. Smith, 4
MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1753 (Cir. Ct. 1978), leave to appeal
denied, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1761 (Mich. 1978) (records
of conversations with defendant sought by state); State
v. De La Roche, 3 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2317 (NJ. Super.
Ct. 1977) (tape of interview with defendant sought by
state); New York v. LeGrand, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA)
1897 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 4 MED. L. REP. 2524 (App. Div.
1979) (confidential information sought by defendant-
no privilege found because former journalist had become
riality" are mentioned most often by judges. This
means that in cases where a court feels that either
the identity of a news source or the confidential
information in a reporters possession is relevant
and material to the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused, or to the classification of the offense, it will
deny the privilege claim and order the name or
material disclosed.It 2 If, however, the newsman's
confidential information is only "collateral ' ' t33 or
"tangential ' '134 to the case, the court will accept
the first amendment argument and uphold the
reporter's refusal to testify. This is another appli-
cation of post-Branzburg "balancing" of privilege
claims.
In addition to the question of relevancy and
materiality, state supreme courts in Vermont and
Virginia have added a second test: whether the
information sought is otherwise available from an
alternative source.1ss These two standards taken
a free-lance author); New York v. Zagarino, 4 MED. L.
REP. (BNA) 1693 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (notes of interview with
news source sought by defendant); People v. Dupree, 88
Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (pho-
tographs of scene of crime sought by state); In re Dan, 80
Misc. 2d 399,363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (personal
observations at prison riot sought by state).
Other reported cases did not involve a final appellate
determination as to the reporter's privilege: United States
v. Nuccitelli, No. 18-187 (D.NJ. 1978) (reported in Good-
ale, supra note 45, at 316) (all notes, documents and
records compiled by reporters sought by defendants);
CBS v. Superior Court, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1568 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978) (filmed outtakes sought by defendants);
and State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974)
(news source's identity sought by defendant). Though the
court in St. Peter did not decide whether the reporter
would be permitted to exercise his newsman's privilege,
it did acknowledge a first amendment basis for such a
claim. The Nuccitelli court refused to quash the subpoena,
but also said it would not enforce the defendant's overly
broad "fishing expedition."
'32 See State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 577, 581 P.2d
812, 815 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1265 (1979).
33 See Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 758,
204 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974);.
People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 854, 370 N.Y.S. 2d
1007, 1013 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
"" See Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 620, 266
N.W.2d 279, 287 (1978).
135 The Virginia Supreme Court has provided the most
complete enunciation of the "materiality/alternative
sources" test to date. Justice Poff described it in Brown
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974):
We are of opinion that when there are reasonable
grounds to believe that information in the possession
of a newsman is material to proof of any element of
a criminal offense, or to proof of the defense asserted
by the defendant, or to a reduction in the classifi-
cation or gradation of the offense charged, or to a
together are easily recognized as a criminal trial
variant on the first two disclosure criteria recom-
mended by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg dis-
sent. 1' The Justice's third suggested requirement,
demonstration of "a compelling and overriding
interest in the information," has not been explicitly
adopted in subsequent state criminal decisions,
though the tone of several of the opinions suggests
that such a standard is to be implied."3 7
Most of the criminal cases involving privilege
claims have been decided in state, rather than
federal courts, and most of the original disclosure
motions have been made on behalf of defendants
who were seeking either the identity of witnesses or
information for impeachment purposes. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia has said that:
The Sixth Amendment rights of a citizen accused
of crime ... to "call for evidence in his favor" are
rights of no less dignity than the right of the gov-
ernment to prosecute. Nor are society's demands
that the privilege yield to the legitimate needs of
law enforcement superior to the demands of due
process that the privilege yield to the legitimate
needs of the accused to defend himself. 38
It is worth noting, however, that defendants
have had significantly less success than prosecutors
in securing court orders for disclosure. In reported
cases between 1972 and 1979,judges directed news-
men to turn over information to defendants in only
four of seventeen instances, while the state won
favorable rulings in four of five cases.'38 Another
decision requiring disclosure involved a court's or-
mitigation of the penalty attached, the defendant's
need to acquire such information is essential to a
fair trial; when such information is not otherwise
available, the defendant has a due process right to
compel disclosure of such information and the iden-
tity of the source; and any privilege of confidentiality
claimed by the newsman must, upon pain of con-
tempt, yield to that right.
214 Va. at 757, 204 S.E.2d at 431 (emphasis in original).
This explanation drew upon the Supreme Court of Ver-
mont's test in State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d
254 (1974) and was adopted by the Kansas Supreme
Court in State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812
(1978), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 1265 (1979).
2db See 408 U.S. at 743; note 75 & accompanying text
sup ra.
137 References to "overriding" need or concern are
found in State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. at 271, 315 A.2d at
256, and Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d at 616, 618, 266
N.W.2d at 286-87, though in neither case is it made an
explicit standard for disclosure.
38 Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204
S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
13 9 See note 131 supra.
der on its own behalf where the judge sought to
learn the source of a "leaked" deposition.140
One commentator explaining the trend toward
favoring prosecution requests noted that "Itihe
fault lies not in deficient protection of the criminal
defendant's interest, but in an overgenerous award
of prosecutorial discretion in determining when
compulsory disclosure of press confidences is war-
ranted.'14' Another possible explanation for this
pattern favoring the prosecution appears to lie in
the "materiality" standard. Defense attorneys often
seek evidence from newsmen that has little bearing
on the actual guilt or innocence of their clients.
When this occurs, courts have not been inclined to
revoke the reporter's privilege.
In cases where either the defendant or the pros-
ecution has sought information, notes, tape record-
ings, or video outtakes, courts occasionally have
agreed to order disclosure when the identity of the
source is known. The first post-Branzburg case to
adopt this approach was United States v. Liddy.1
42
Alfred Baldwin, a member of the infamous White
House "Plumbers Unit," had agreed to become a
government witness against the Watergate burglars
in return for a grant of immunity. Prior to trial, he
gave an interview to reporters from the Los Angeles
Times which resulted in several stories appearing in
that newspaper. The defendants then subpoenaed
"all papers, recordings and transcripts" of the in-
terview, hoping to use them to impeach Baldwin's
testimony at trial. The court noted that the news-
paper was not seeking to protect the identity of any
news source: "Mr. Baldwin's name is emblazoi~ed
on the pages of the Los Angeles Times ... for the
world to see. 143 The court then discussed the
impact of Branzburg and concluded: "If impeach-
ment evidence is available, it is critical that the
defendants have access to it. If the 'striking of a
proper balance' is required, as Mr. Justice Powell
suggests, this Court will always strike the balance
in favor of due process.' The opinion did not
mention the materiality, alternative sources, or
compelling need tests recommended by Justice
Stewart. But the focus on the previous disclosure
of the news source as a rationale for requiring the
newspaper to turn over its information has been
140 See Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99
Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
:41 Murasky, supra note 69, at 898.
242 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C.), affd, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). This was one of the several Watergate-related
cases presided over by District Judge John Sirica.
143 54 F. Supp. at 212.
.4Id. at 215.
COMMENT [Vol. 70
THE FALLACY OF FARBER
cited or otherwise followed by a few courts.1,4
5
Other judges however, have chosen to apply only
the materiality or relevancy tests to situations
where the source already was known and thus have
ignored the Liddy approach.
146
In only one case prior to Farber did a defendant
seek both a reporter's confidential notes and the
identity of his source. That occurred in People v.
Marahan,147 a 1975 New York case in which the two
defendants sought to impeach the testimony of
police officers following an arrest for illegal posses-
sion of weapons. A county supreme court quashed
subpoenas directed to a New York Daily News
reporter, holding that the information sought was
collateral to the question of guilt. The court held
that requiring the reporter to divulge either the
identity of the source or the information under
such circumstances would violate his rights under
both the first amendment and the New York shield
law.
148
IV. THE COMPLICATED CASE OF MYRON FARBER
For Myron A. Farber, the trail that would lead
him to his confrontation between journalist and
jurist began in August 1975. Farber, a reporter
with the New York Times since 1966, was assigned
by his editors in August 1975 to follow up on a tip
concerning a ten-year-old unsolved mystery, the
suspicious, but never explained deaths of thirteen
persons at a small hospital in Oradell, New Jer-
sey.149 Farber spent the next four months trying to
piece' the puzzle together. Finally, on January 7
and 8, 1976, the results of his, investigation ap-
peared in print.'5W In two dramatic front-page sto-
ries, Farber laid out a carefully researched case
that strongly suggested a doctor on the hospital's
14 See CBS v. Superior Court, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA)
1568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (Liddy not cited, but similar
rationale followed in rejecting state shield law claim);
State v. De La Roche, 3 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2317 (N.J.
Super. Ct., 1977). Contra People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d
637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (distinguished
Liddy). See also New York v. Zagarino, 4 MED. L. REP.
(BNA) 1693 (Sup. Ct., 1978) (distinguished Marahan).
1'6 See Florida v. Morel, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2309
(Cir. Ct. 1979); Florida v. Hurston, 3 MED. L. REP.
(BNA) 2295 (Cir. Ct. 1978); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc.
2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
14' 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
'48Id. at 643-44, 650-51,368 N.Y.S.2d at 692, 699.
149 For one account of how both the Jascalevich and
Farber cases developed out of the reporter's initial inves-
tigation and stories, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1978, § B,
at 8, col. 1.
See id., Jan. 7, 1976, at i, col. 1; id., Jan. 8, 1976, at
1, col. 5.
surgical staff had murdered patients with injections
of a muscle relaxant drug called curare. Because
no official accusations had ever been brought con-
cerning the deaths, Farber identified the physician
only as "Dr. X."'
51
In the first of the "Dr. X" articles, Bergen
County, New Jersey, prosecutor Joseph Woodcock
announced the state had reopened its own investi-
gation into the deaths. The evidence uncovered by
that probe was presented to a grand jury. Farber
was not called as a witness before the grand jury,
nor were any of his notes subpoenaed. 5 2 On May
19, 1976, the grand jury indicted Dr. Mario E.
Jascalevich, former chief of surgery at Riverdell
Hospital, charging him with the murder by poison-
ing of five patients."ss The alleged motive was a
desire to discredit other physicians on the hospital
staff.
In November 1977, the defense counsel for Jas-
calevich submitted a list of his prospective defense
witnesses, including Farber.15 TheJascalevich trial
began on February 27, 1978. A subpoena ad testi-
ficandum was served on Farber two days later and
he appeared in court on May 24 to testify briefly,
outside the jury's presence, about the access he had
been given to the state's ten-year-old records on the
Riverdell deaths. He declined, however, to answer
questions about how he had obtained a copy of a
previously missing deposition of Dr. Jascalevich,
claiming the protection of the New Jersey shield
law.1ss
This testimony did not satisfy defense counsel.
The attorney insisted that he would have to see the
entire file that Farber had amassed during his four-
month investigation. According to the defense, the
deaths had resulted from incompetent treatment
provided by other doctors on the hospital staff.
The charges against .Jascalevich, the lawyer ar-
gued, had been "concocted" by Farber and prose-
cutor Woodcock for "financial gain" and were part
of a conspiracy "to advance their careers.""i This
theory was based on three facts: (1) Prosecutor
151 See id.
1s
2 Id., July 25, 1978, § B, at 6, col. 4. Also, author's
interview with Sybil Moses, assistant prosecutor, Bergen
County, New Jersey.
163 See State v. Jascalevich, Indictment No. S-495-76;
N.Y. Times, May 20, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 2.
l' State v. Jascalevich, 158 NJ. Super. 488, 386 A.2d
466 (1978).
"' State v. Jascalevich, No. S-495-76, oral opinion oh
motion to quash subpoena duces tecum (NJ. Super. Ct.
June 30, 1978). See also N.Y. Times, May 25, 1978, § B,
at 4, col. 3.1w See note 149 supra.
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Woodcock had given Farber permission to examine
the state's files on the deaths; (2) Farber had
discovered, during his research, a copy of the miss-
ing 1966 Jascalevich deposition and then turned it
over to the prosecutor; and (3) Farber had signed
a contract to write a book about the case. The
defense argued that the conviction of Jascalevich
would stimulate sales of the book and would thus
enrich the reporter. 157
Farber had repeatedly denied any collusion with
the prosecutor and also had insisted that there was
nothing in his files that would prove either the
defendant's guilt or innocence." But, because his
files contained the names of persons who had been
promised confidentiality in return for their agree-
ment to be interviewed, Farber said he would not
permit his notes to be examined.'5 9
In May, in an ex parte action, the defense ap-
plied to the trial court for a subpoena duces tecum
directed against Farber and the New York Times
Co. The defense affidavit requested "all statements,
pictures, memoranda, recordings and notes of in-
terviews of witnesses for the defense and prosecu-
tion ... as well as information delivered to the
Bergen County Prosecutor's office and contractual
information relating to the above which are in the
possession, custody or control of" Farber and the
Times.160 In effect, the defense was asking for every-
thing Farber had compiled in the course of his
investigation. The defense argued that Jascalevich
would be deprived of his sixth amendment right to
compel testimony and confront his accusers if Far-
ber were not required to produce all the informa-
tion.1
61
The trial court accepted the defense arguments
and agreed to seek the subpoenas. Since Farber
lived in New York State and his newspaper's prin-
cipal place of business was there, it was necessary
for the judge to issue a certificate of materiality
under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance
of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings.'62 This certificate was submitted to
the New York Supreme Court.
Attorneys for Farber and the Times appeared
before the New York County Supreme Court on
157 id.
158 Id.
159 Id.160 See In re Superior Court, subpoena duces tecum No.
8867/78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). See also New York Times
Co. v. Jascalevich, -U.S.-, -, 99 S. Ct. 6, 11 (1978).
161 See note 10 supra.
'62 See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:81-18 to -23 (West 1976);
N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAw § 640-10 subd. (2) (McKinney
1971).
May 31, 1978, to contest the application for the
subpoenas. They argued that the defense affidavit
provided insufficient legal grounds for the trial
court's certificate of materiality and that the files
sought were privileged under both the first amend-
ment and the New York and New Jersey shield
laws.5 The New York court would not permit an
offer of proof of these contentions"8 an - three days
later, issued the subpoenas duces tecum.65 The
opinion accompanying the subpoena indicated
that the responsibility for hearing Farber's substan-
tive constitutional and statutory objections lay with
the New Jersey courts which were bound to allow
full faith and credit to the laws of New York to
protect the statutory entitlements of New York
citizens.'66
The order was appealed to the appellate division
of the supreme court and then to Judge Fuchsberg
of New York's highest judicial body, the court of
appeals, but the court at both levels held that such
an order could not be appealed under New York
law." 8 The motion to quash a subpoena duces
tecum had to be made in the court in which the
subpoena was returnable-in this case, the New
Jersey Superior Court.
Attorneys for Farber and the Times argued in the
New Jersey Superior Court that the subpoenas
should be quashed because (1) they were over-
broad, especially in light of the first amendment
considerations involved; (2) there had been no
showing of materiality or necessity for the docu-
ments sought; and (3) Farber's files were protected
from compelled disclosure by the Constitution and
New York and New Jersey shield laws." The court
refused to hear the appellants' arguments or rule
on the merits of the motions to quash until it had
an opportunity to examine the subpoenaed mate-
rials in camera.5 One of the Times' attorneys on
the case responded that submitting Farber's notes,
even for an in camera inspection, would be "invad-
ing the very rights we seek to protect" because the
judge, as a representative of the judiciary, was also
'" See Brief for Appellants at 4-5, In re Farber, No. A-
4741-77 (NJ. App. Div. 1978).
164 id.
'
5 See Superior Court v. Farber, 94 Misc. 2d 886, 405
N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
'66 Id. at 886, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
67 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 2304 (McKinney 1974).
See also Brief for Appellants at 5.
'
5 9 See Brief for Appellants at 6.
'
6 9 See State v. Jascalevich, No. S-495-76, oral opinion
on motion to quash subpoena duces tecum (N.J. Super.
Ct.June 30, 1978).
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an agent of the government.'"0 The appellants
urged a threshold determination by the court on
their arguments, prior to the in camera examina-
tion, but the judge refused to do this and instead




In the next week, both the Appellate Division of
the Superior Court and the New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to hear appeals of the judge's ruling.
The case was then taken before Justices of the
United States Supreme Court for the first time and
on July 11 and 12, 1978, both Justice White and
Justice Marshall refused applications for a stay of
the trial court's order, holding that the case was
not yet ripe for review. 72 Justice White, the author
of the Branzburg plurality opinion, found reason to
refer to that case in his ruling:
Motions to quash subpoenas are not usually ap-
pealable in the federal court system.... The appli-
cants insist that as a constitutional matter, the rule
must be different where, as here, the subpoena runs
against a reporter and the press.... There is no
present authority in this Court that a newsman
need not produce documents material to the prose-
cution or defense of a criminal case, cf. Branzburg v.
Hayes..., or that the obligation to obey an other-
wise valid subpoena served on a newsman is condi-
tioned upon the showing of special circumstances.17
Farber and the Times still refused to turn their
records over to the court without a full hearing on
the substantive challenges to the subpoena. An
order returnable before a different Bergen County
Superior Court judge was issued directing the ap-
pellants to show cause why they should not be held
in criminal contempt of court for their failure to
comply with the order to produce.1
7 4
During the initial hearing on the criminal con-
tempt order, attorneys for Farber argued that the
order had been served on him illegally in New
York rather than New Jersey. The court then
ordered the defense to apply to the trial court for
an additional order to show cause in aid of a
litigant.'7 5 A failure to comply with this order
"T Statement by Eugene Scheiman; N.Y. Times, July
7, 1978, § B, at 3, col. 3.
1' See State v. Jascalevich, No. S-495-76, oral opinion.
on motion to quash subpoena duces tbcum (NJ. Super.'
Ct.June 30, 1978).
12 See New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, -U.S.-,
98 S. Ct. 3058, 3060 (1978).
'73 -U.S.-, id. at 3059-60.
"
7 4 See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, 332
(1978). See also Brief for Appellants at 8-9.
'17 Brief for Appellants at 8-9.
would mean an additional penalty for the appel-
lants, this time for civil contempt of court.
With this directive, the entire process began
anew. Again the trial court issued a certificate of
materiality directed to the New York County Su-
preme Court. The certificate included a provision,
as required by the Uniform Witness Attendance
Act, that "Myron Farber, upon coming into the
State of New Jersey, will be given protection from
arrest or service of process upon him, civil or crim-
inal, as set forth in the New Jersey Statute Anno-
tated 2A:8-18 et. seq."'176 Again without addressing
the substantive issues, the supreme court ordered
Farber to appear.177
Farber returned to New Jersey. While he was
appearing in regard to the civil order in aid of a
litigant, a deputy state attorney general sought
permission to serve the earlier issued criminal con-
tempt order. Although attorneys for the reporter
argued that he was appearing pursuant to the
requirements of the Uniform Witness Attendance
Act and was immune from service under both the
explicit language of the Act and the trial court's
certificate, the judge still permitted the order to be
served upon Farber.1
7 8
On July 24, the Bergen County Superior Court
found both Farber and the Times guilty of criminal
and civil contempt. The newspaper was fined
$100,000 for criminal contempt and Farber was
sentenced to six months in jail and fined $1,000 for
the criminal conviction. In an effort to compel
production of the subpoenaed documents for Jas-
calevich, the court also ordered a civil contempt
fine of $5,000 a day for the Times and another
$1,000 for Farber. The reporter was sentenced to
remain in jail until he complied with the civil
order." a The jail sentence for criminal contempt
would not begin until after Farber produced his
files, and the time served for civil contempt would
not be applied to the criminal sentence.
Later that day, the appellate division of the
superior court granted a stay of the criminal con-
tempt orders, but denied a stay of the orders for
relief of a litigant. Farber spent seven hours in jail
July 24 and was freed only after a member of the
state's supreme court ordered his release pending
further consideration of the case.18°
On July 25, the New Jersey Supreme Court, by
identical five-to-one votes, declined to stay the civil
'
76 1d. at 10.
'7Id. at 11.
'
78 M.d at 11-12.
'7 78 N.J. -, 394 A.2d at 332.
8'°See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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contempt conviction and denied a motion for direct
certification, thus refusing to speed up the state
appellate process. Thejustices did permit, however,
a temporary stay so that once again, Farber and
the Times could appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court.'
The case again went before Justice White. He
declined to intervene. This time, the Justice cited
not only Branzburg, but also Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 82 apparently for the proposition that the
press was not entitled to any special protection
under the first amendment.
There is no present authority in this Court either
that newsmen are constitutionally privileged to
withhold duly subpoenaed documents material to
the prosecution or defense of a criminal case or that
a defendant seeking the subpoena must show ex-
traordinary circumstances before enforcement
against newsmen will be had. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes
... ; see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.... 18
The Times next took its appeal to Justice Mar-
shall, but he also refused to intervene. The Justice
expressed support on the merits for the positions
taken by the appellants, but said they had not met
the criteria for the granting of a stay since they had
not demonstrated "a balance of hardships in their
favor," nor had they shown that "the issue was so
substantial that four Justices ... would likely vote
to grant a writ of certiorari.'1
8 4
Justice Marshall did, however, express serious
reservations about the way in which the case had
been handled in the New Jersey courts. He noted
that the appellants had been found guilty of con-
tempt and sentenced without any hearing on the
substantive issues raised by Farber and the Times.
Then, citing United States v. Nixon, s5 Carey v.
Hume, s'  Baker v. F & F Investment, 8 7 and Democratic
National Committee v. McCord,t88 the Justice indicated
that he felt some threshold showing of materiality,
relevance, and necessity ought to have been made
by the trial judge before he issued a certificate or
before he ordered in camera inspection. The single
181 See id.
'82 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
's3 New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, -U.S.-,
99 S. Ct. 6, 10 (1978) (White, J., denial of stay).
184 New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, -U.S.-, -,
99 S. Ct. 11, 15 (1978) (Marshall, J., denial of stay).i 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
188492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974). See note 97 & accompanying text supra.
18 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973); see note 105 & accompanying text supra.
188 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); see note 105 supra.
defense affidavit, asserting only a general need for
the materials subpoenaed, did not provide an ad-
equate factual basis upon which the trial court
could have determined materiality, necessity, or
relevance.'
8 9
Following the refusal of the Supreme Court jus-
tices, Myon Farber returned to jail on August 4.
On August 18, Farber turned over the incom-
plete and unedited manuscript of his book on the
Jascalevich case to the trial court. The Times also
surrendered all of the newspaper's files on the case.
Farber indicated in a letter to ,the judge that he
was making the manuscript available merely to
disprove charges that he was profiteering from the
murder trial and its release was not intended as a
waiver of his right to protect his files. t9° The news-
paper's records only dealt with contractual ar-
rangements which had been made public through
other sources.1
91
On August 30, the New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed to hear the reporter's case without prior
review by the appellate division.' 92 Farber was
freed after twenty-seven days in jail and the fines
were stayed temporarily. Oral argument was heard
September 5, and on September 21, the court
announced its decision. By a vote of five-to-two,
the contempt convictions of the newspaper and the
reporter were upheld.' 93 The opinions in that case
are examined and analyzed in the next sections of
this comment.
Farber was to return to jail the next day, but
Justice Stewart granted a temporary stay pending
a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on a motion
for certiorari. 94 Meanwhile, the Jascalevich trial
was nearing a conclusion and defense counsel asked
the Supreme Court to end the stay because the
time for forcing compliance with the subpoena was
running out. Without reaching any decision on
whether it would hear the case, the Court vacated
the stay. 95
Farber went to jail for the third time on October
12. Eleven days later, the Jascalevich murder trial
189 - U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 14-15.
90 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1 5 (Aug. 29, 1978) (News
Notes section, back cover, Farber Turns Over Manuscript,
Times Yields Files). See also Reply Brief for Appellants at
Appendix, In re Farber, No. A-4741-77 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1978).
191 Id.
'9 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 332. See also note 149
supra.
19' In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied,
-U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
"" See New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, -U.S.-,
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ended and the case went to the jury. The next day,
the Bergen County Superior Court ordered the
reporter released on the civil contempt penalty
because his notes were no longer needed. The judge
also suspended the six-month criminal contempt
sentence.19
An hour after Farber's release, the jury reached
its verdict: Dr. Jascalevich was found not guilty on
all charges. Medical experts called to testify at trial
had disagreed on the critical question of whether
curare could be detected in a body ten years after
death. The jurors had heard thirty-four weeks of
testimony, but had deliberated less than three
hours.'
97
On November 28, the United States Supreme
Court added the final note in the case, declining,
without comment, to review the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's decision in In re Farber, 19 thus leav-
ing the contempt convictions intact.' 99 The New
York Times had paid $285,000 in fines.2 Myron
Farber had spent forty days in jail, the second
longest incarceration for a reporter claiming the
protection of a newsman's privilege, but had never
surrendered his confidential files.
V. WHAT THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
DECIDED
The New Jersey Supreme Court heard oral ar-
gument in the Farber case on September 5, 1978.
Just sixteen days later, the seven-member court
announced its decision, in four separate opinions.
201
Writing for a five-to-two majority, Justice Moun-
tain announced that both the criminal and civil
contempt judgments against Farber and the Times
were to be upheld. The Court held that neither the
first amendment nor the state's news media shield
law would sanction Farber's refusal to turn over
his files when a defendant's constitutional rights in
a murder trial were at stake. 20
A. THE OPINION OF THE COURT
1. The First Amendment
The majority opinion initially addressed the
claim of first amendment protection. The opinion
"a Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1978, § A, at 1, col 2;
Washington Star, Oct. 24, 1978, § A, at 1, col 2.
197 See note 149 supra.
" New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, -U.S.-, 99
S. Ct. 598 (1978) (certiorari denied).
"'See N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 5.
200ld
2" In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied,
-U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
_ Id. at -, -, 394 A.2d at 334, 337.
outlined the journalist's argument that the gath-
ering and dissemination of news would be "seri-
ously impaired" without a press privilege to keep
information and sources confidential, because in-
formants would be less willing to confide in report-
ers. This would result in a "substantial lessening"
of the flow of news on issues of public concern and
the ensuing injury to the public interest would
violate the first amendment's guarantee of a free
press.2w The court rejected this argument. Refer-
ring to Branzburg, the opinion indicated that "[in
our view the Supreme Court of the United States
has clearly rejected this claim and has squarely
held that no such First Amendment right exists."
' 4
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the Branz-
burg decision had since been "underscored and
applied directly to this case by Justice White in a
brief opinion filed.., upon ... his denial of a stay
sought by these appellants."
' M
Having rejected the first amendment claim, the
majority opinion suggested the press was not with-
out first amendment protections, including the
right "to refrain from revealing its sources except
upon legitimate demand. Demand is not legitimate
when the desired information is patently irrelevant
to the needs of the inquirer or his needs are not
manifestly compelling."
206
Farber and the Times had urged the court to
consider Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Branzburg as supporting a balancing test under
which the validity of subpoenas would be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis. The New Jersey
court rejected that approach:
The particular path that any Justice may have
followed becomes unimportant when once it is seen
that a majority have reached the same destination.
... [W]e do no weighing or balancing of societal
interests in reaching our determination that the
First Amendment does not afford appellants the
privilege they claim. The weighing and balancing
has been done by a higher court. 07
Finally, the majority concluded, Branzburg must
be binding here because "the obligation to appear
at a criminal trial on behalf of a defendant who is
enforcing his Sixth Amendment rights is at least as
compelling as the duty to appear before a grand
jury. ' 's °2
' Id. at -, 394 A.2d at 333.
2Nid.




2. The Shield Law and the Sixth Amendment
The court next addressed the claims raised under
the New Jersey shield law.2°9 The opinion noted
that no shield law had been involved in the reso-
lution of the Branzburg cases, but acknowledged
that the state law invoked here was "said to be as
strongly worded as any in the country.', 210 The
court then emphasized that it was "abundantly
clear" Farber and the Times came fully within the
protection of the law and that "[vliewed on its face,
considered solely as a reflection of legislative intent
to bestow upon the press as broad a shield as
possible to protect against forced revelation of con-
fidential source materials, this legislation is entirely
constitutional.,
21
However, the shield law had to be examined in
light of the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution 21 2 and article 1, paragraph 10, of the
New Jersey Constitution. 213 Dr. Jascalevich based
his demands for information on these constitutional
provisions. "He invokes the rather elementary but
entirely sound proposition that where Constitution
and statute collide, the latter must yield.... [Wie
find this argument unassailable."
214
The majority opinion emphasized that the sixth
2' The New Jersey Newspaperman's Privilege Law,
provides, in pertinent part:
Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, engaged
in, connected with, or employed by news media for
the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting,
compiling, editing or disseminating news for the
general public or on whose behalf news is so gath-
ered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or
disseminated has a privilege to refuse to disclose, in
any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any
investigative body, including, but not limited to,
any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative
agency, the Legislature or legislative committee, or
elsewhere.
a. The source, author, means, agency or person
from or through whom any information was pro-
cured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered,
transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated, or de-
livered; and
b. Any news or information obtained in the
course of pursuing his professional activities whether
or not it is disseminated.
NJ. STAT ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1979-80).
210 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 335.
21 Id. at -, 394 A.2d at 336.
212 See note 10 supra.
213 N.J. CONsT. art. 1, T 10, provides, in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor...."
214 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 336.
amendment's compulsory process clause is binding
upon the states. 2 15 The opinion pointed out that
the New Jersey state constitution contained "ex-
actly the same language" on compulsory process as
the federal constitution.
We interpret it [Article 1, paragraph 101 as affording
a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the produc-
tion of documents and other material for which he
may have, or may believe he has, a legitimate need
in preparing or undertaking his defense. It also
means that witnesses properly summoned will be
required to testify and that material demanded by
a properly phrased subpoena duces necum will be forth-
coming and available for appropriate examination
and use .... We hold that Article 1, 10 of our
Constitution prevails over this statute.
2 1 6
The majority conceded that other unspecified
testimonial privileges, whether derived from com-
mon law or statute, would appear to conflict with
the same constitutional provision. The court ven-
tured no further opinion on such privileges, but





3. Procedural Mechanism for Disclosure
Having determined that neither the first amend-
ment nor the state shield law could shelter Farber
from the subpoena's demands, the court next ad-
dressed the problem of procedural mechanisms for
disclosure. Attorneys'for the Times had repeatedly
insisted that their clients were entitled to a full
hearing on the issues of relevance, materiality, and
overbreadth of the subpoena before contempt pen-
alties could be imposed. The court agreed that
such a hearing was necessary, but said the appel-
lant had "aborted" it by refusing to submit the
subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection. 2 8
The majority saw the in camera examination in
a completely different light than the Times. While
the newspaper contended there must be a full
showing and definitive judicial determination of
need, relevance, and the absence of less intrusive
means of obtaining the information prior to the
trial judge's inspection, the state supreme court felt
such a rule would "effectively stultify" the judicial
criminal process.2 9 The court maintained that in
2'5 The court cited Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967), as authority for this proposition.
216 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 337.
2 7 Id.
218 Nd.
2'9 78 N.J. at -,394 A.2d at 338.
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camera inspection "is no more than a procedural
tool [and] ... is not in itself an invasion of the
statutory privilege. Rather it is a preliminary step
to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the
statutory privilege must yield to the defendant's
constitutional rights."22
'
Despite this view, however, the court still agreed
the appellants ought to be afforded a preliminary
determination before being compelled to submit
their materials for in camera examination. The
court did not base this conclusion upon any first
amendment considerations, but rather upon an
"obligation to give as much effect as possible,
within... constitutional limitations, to the very
positively expressed legislative intent" manifested
in the shield law.Y'
To meet this threshold determination, the court
said a defendant seeking disclosure would have to
satisfy the trial judge "by a fair preponderance of
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences,"
that he had met the requirements of a three-part
test. The defendant must show: (I) there was a
reasonable probabiliiy or likelihood that the infor-
mation sought was material and relevant to his
defense; (2)" the materials could not be secured
from any less intrusive source; and (3) the defend-
ant had a legitimate need to see and use the
information.2 This three-part test is derived from
Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg.
m
The Farber court emphasized that its opinion was
not to be taken as "license for fishing expeditions"
in every criminal case, nor as permission for "in-
discriminate rummaging" through newspaper
files.224 However, the majority concluded it still
was unnecessary in this case to remand for a formal
"threshold determination."' 25 Instead, the court,
operating under state rules that permitted it to
exercise limited original jurisdiction for factfinding
purposes," examined the record before it and
ruled that there was sufficient evidence to meet its
test. The majority noted that the Jascalevich case
had been in progress eighteen weeks at the time the
in camera inspection was challenged. The trial
judge's knowledge of the issues and facts involved
afforded a "more than adequate factual basis upon
which to rest a conclusion" that the prerequisites
I-0 d. at -, 394 A.2d at 337-38.
22' Id. at -, 394 A.2d at 338.
= Id.
223 A number of other states have adopted similar tests.
See notes 75 & 135 & accompanying text supra.
T24 78 NJ. at -, 394 A.2d at 339.
2 Id.
2m NJ. Sup. CT. R. 2:10-5.
established by the court had been fully met-even
though he had not articulated them in the specific
fashion prescribed by the court.2 7 The majority
found support for this conclusion in its review of
the trial record and of documentation filed on
behalf of defendant Jascalevich. Considered partic-
ularly significant was the trial judge's knowledge
of the "close association" Farber had allegedly
enjoyed with the prosecutor's office since before the
indictment of the doctor. "This glaring fact of their
close working relationship may well serve to distin-
guish this case from the vast majority of others in
which defendants seek disclosure from newsmen in
the face of the Shield Law."m
The other three opinions in the case focused, for
the most part, on this final procedural issue. Chief
Justice Hughes, in a brief concurrence, conceded
that it would have been better for the trial court to
have made a formal threshold determination of the
competing claims. But the trial court's failure to




Two dissenting opinions were filed. Justice Han-
dler dissented "with misgivings" because he found
himself in "substantial accord" with much of the
majority's reasoning. He agreed with the Branzburg
view that the existence of a newsman's privilege
was not to be inferred from the first amendment
and he also felt the state's shield law should not be
interpreted as providing absolute or unqualified
protection. In camera inspection of confidential
materials might be necessary to settle a "legal tug
of war," but, a remand should have been ordered
in this instance because of "the inadequacy of the
present record to justify" the contempt judg-
ments.z ° In his view, the certificates of materiality
issued by the trial court disclosed some likelihood
that some of the material sought was relevant, but
yielded only "a bare conclusion" as to its necessity.
Furthermore, they were silent as to alternative
sources and "indifferent as to matters of over-
breadth, oppressiveness and unreasonableness."3
1
Such findings were insufficient for contempt judg-
ments because the trial court's "insistence upon the
requisite showing of need should be unyielding and
meticulous."
' -2
227 78 NJ. at -, 394 A.2d at 339.
22 id.
m Id. at -, 394 A.2d at 341 (Hughes, CJ., concur-
rin'd at - 394 A.2d at 348 (Handler, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at -,394 A.2d at 353 (Handler, J., dissenting).
212 id.
Justice Pashman's dissent was more vehement,
but still focused on the procedural issue and urged
a remand so that the appellants might have a
hearing on the merits of their objections.
The majority's assertion that appellants were indeed
accorded a due process hearing prior to in camera
inspection is simply without foundation in the rec-
ord .... I find it totally unimaginable that the ma-
jority can even consider allowing a man to be sent
to jail without a full and orderly hearing at which
to present his defenses.2
Justice Pashman saw no need to deal with the
appellants' first amendment claims because their
claim of privilege under the state shield law was
meritorious.2-' The statute was amended after the
Supreme Court had announced in Branzburg that
state legislatures were free to set their own stan-
dards as to testimonial privileges for the press. The
new law was thus "New Jersey's response to the
Court's invitation." It reflected the "legislature's
judgment that an uninhibited news media is more
important to the proper functioning of our society
than is the ability of either law enforcement agen-
cies, the courts or criminal defendants to gain
access to confidential news data."2 - He concluded
that the shield law granted journalists absolute
immunity from disclosure, including in camera
inspection. Courts were given no discretion to de-
cide in an individual case that the societal impor-
tance of a free and robust press was outweighed by
other interests. The "weighing and balancing" al-
ready had been done by the state legislature which
had decided that the right to nondisclosure was
paramount in every instance.=
However, the justice conceded that no statute
could be applied so as to abridge an individual's
constitutional rights and so he too urged a remand
for the purpose of a formal hearing. His opinion
contained detailed recommendations as to the pro-
cedure that should be followed, including sugges-
tions that the trial judge prepare findings of fact
and conclusions of law at each stage of the pro-
ceedings and that all parties be permitted to appeal
the judge's decisions, either as to the necessity for
in camera inspection, or the release of information
after the judge's examination.s 7 He stressed that
throughout the entire process the trial court must
"constantly keep in mind the strong presumption
2' Id. 343 (Pashman, J., dissenting).




7 Id. at 347.
againstediscl6sure of protected materials. All doubts
concerning disclosure should be resolved in favor
of non-disclosure."
'
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE FARBER DEcISION
The procedures followed by the New Jersey and
New York courts, taken as a whole, resulted in a
significant deprivation of the constitutional due
process protections to which Farber and the New
York Times were entitled. Important distinctions
may be drawn between Farber and other criminal
cases involving claims of newsman's privilege.
When the New York County Supreme Court
initially ruled on the application for subpoenas
duces tecum sought against the reporter and his
newspaper, the court made it clear that it was
issuing the subpoenas with the full expectation,
based upon the Uniform Act to Secure the Atten-
dance of Witnesses from Without a State in Crim-
inal Proceedings and the certificate of materiality
submitted by the New Jersey trial court, that a full
hearing would be held in the New Jersey court "at
which all issues of privilege, statutory and consti-
tutional, may be raised." The New York court
did not permit offers of proof as to the alleged
insufficiency in law and fact of the certificate2 40
since absent an abuse of discretion or evidence of
arbitrariness on the part of the issuing judge, the
court was bound to allow the certificate "full faith
and credit. '24 By the terms of the Act, the certifi-
cate of the requesting state was prima facie evi-
dence of the materiality and need alleged
therein.242
The New York appellate courts refused to review
the order because under state law, the motion to
quash the subpoenas has to be made iii the court
= Id.
239 Superior Court v. Farber, 94 Misc. 2d 886, 405
N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
2'o It should be noted that the constitutionality of the
entire Uniform Act to Compel Witnesses from Without
the State in Criminal Proceedings was sharply attacked
by two Justices on'the only occasion in which the United
States Supreme Court has considered the law. See New
York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 12 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting, in an opinion in which Black, J., concurred).
The Supreme Court, in a narrow holding, ruled that the
Act was not unconstitutional on its face and upheld its
application in the particular case, in part, because of the
stringent procedural safeguards it was designed to pro-
vide.
241 405 N.Y.S.2d at 991. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 1,
provides in pertinent part: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each state to the public Acts, records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State."
"
2 See N.Y. CraM. PROc. LAW § 640.10 subd.(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1978), cited in 405 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
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to which the subpoenas are returnable 24a-even if
that means an appearance in a court outside the
state. Since Hackensack, New Jersey, was just
across the state line, the court concluded there
would be no inordinate hardship involved in re-
quiring Farber to seek his relief there.
Unfortunately, the expectations of the New York
judges who ordered Farber and the Times to comply
with the subpoenas were never realized. Farber
and the Times were never permitted to brief or to
argue the substantive challenges to the subpoenas.
To satisfy the requirements of due process, the
appellants were entitled to, and should have been
granted, "a full hearing on the issues of relevance,
materiality and overbreadth of the subpoenas."2"
No one on any side of this conflict ever questioned
that conclusion. Farber and the Times continually
sought such a hearing. The New York judges as-
sumed they would receive it. Justice Marshall em-
phasized its necessity in his August 4th ruling on
the Times' application for a stay.245 The state attor-
ney general charged with prosecuting the criminal
contempt judgment on appeal also acknowledged
the obligation in his appellate division brief and in
his oral argument before the New Jersey Supreme
Court. 6 Both dissenting New Jersey justices ar-
gued that the denial of a hearing was violative of
fourteenth amendment due process rights.247 In-
deed, the majority opinion of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court recognized that the trial court had a
responsibility to conduct such a hearing, but con-
cluded that the newspaper and its reporter had
waived their right to the hearing by refusing to
turn the subpoenaed files over for in camera inspec-
tion.24 That judgment was in error.
The issue in dispute was not whether such a
hearing was required, but when it had to be held.
Five members of the New Jersey Supreme Court
did not believe that it was necessary to conduct the
hearing until after the trial judge had been given
the opportunity to examine Farber's files privately
in chambers. That conclusion, however, disregards
a crucial component of the due process problem
since one of the issues being contested, prior to an
2' N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 2304 (McKinney Supp.
1978).
24 78 NJ. at -, 394 A.2d at 337.
See -U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 15.
2 Brief for Attorney General at 31, In re Farber, No.
A-4741-77, (N.J. App. Div. 1978). Statement by Attorney
General John Degnan,.Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1978,
§ A, at 2, col. 2.
247 78 NJ. at 7-; 394 A.2d at 342-43 (Pashman, J.,
dissenting); id. at 354 (Handler, J., dissenting).
248 78 NJ. at -, 394 A.2d at 337.
in camera inspection, was the legitimacy of, and
necessity for, that very in camera inspection. The
language of the New Jersey shield law, taken on its
face, left no question that Farber and the Times
were protected from forced disclosure not only to
the defendant, but to the trial judge as well.2 9 Due
process required resolution of these claims prior to
an order to produce and certainly prior to the
imposition of penal sanctions. Even the attorney
general in his brief admitted that "the wording of
[the shield law] would indicate that the court of
first impression should determine the applicability
of the rule, including a lack of waiver, before
ordering production, even in camera, of all docu-
ments or items subpoenaed."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
argument because requiring a hearing before in
camera inspection might "stultify the judicial crim-
inal process since it is not rational to ask a judge
to ponder the relevance of the unknown." 251 In so
doing, the court ignored the important role the
legislature plays, not only in enacting the laws that
define and prohibit criminal conduct, but- also in
establishing the rules and guidelines that govern
the adjudication and punishment of crime. The
passage of shield laws for the press, or the estab-
lishment of testimonial privileges to protect other
relationships, is a legitimate and constitutional
exercise of legislative power and represents a prior
balancing of societal interests with the resulting
conclusion that the public benefits derived from
the privileged relationship outweigh the impact of
a restraint upon the judicial process.
Furthermore, as post-Branzburg cases have clearly
demonstrated, the trial judge is not required to
"ponder the relevance of the unknown" in con-
ducting a predisclosure hearing. People v.
Marahan, 1 2 State v. St. Peter,253 and Brown v. Common-
wealth ' in the criminal area, and Baker v. F & F
Investmentm Carey v. Hume,2 and Democratic National
Committee v. McCord2 5 7 in the civil area, all have
249 See note 209 supra.
2 ' Brief for Attorney General at 31.
251 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 338.
252 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1975);
see note 147 & accompanying text supra.
2 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); see note 135 &
accompanying text supra.
2,4 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
966 (1974); see notes 133, 135 & 138 & accompanying
text supra.
255 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973); see note 105 & accompanying text supra.
2'6 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974); see note 97 & accompanying text supra.
57 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); see note 105 supra.
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held that the initial responsibility for showing that
disclosure of a newsman's sources or confidential
information is necessary lies with the party seeking
the disclosure-in this instance, with defendant
Jascalevich. It was he who should have been re-
quired to narrow the focus and indicate to the
court some logical and reasonably specific grounds
for believing that the reporter had information
that was material, relevant, unavailable from al-
ternative sources, and compelling. The vague, es-
sentially conclusory affidavits submitted by Jascal-
evich's attorney did not meet these standards.
At a hearing a newsman also would be able to
submit evidence, thus providing the judge with
additional information upon which to base his
decision. Then, if the party seeking disclosure has
not met his burden, the trial court would be justi-
fied in assuming that the request for revelation was
nothing more than a "fishing expedition" and was
not sufficient to warrant an abridgement of rights
under the first amendment or legislatively enacted
shield protection. This is a far cry from "pondering
the relevance of the unknown." Indeed, it is the
balancing test given birth to in Justice Powell's
Branzburg concurrence and nurtured by a dozen
courts since then.ms
The New Jersey Supreme Court did recognize
the necessity for this sort of threshold determina-
tion, but held that the test would apply to "those
who in the future may be similarly situated",259-
but not Farber and the Times. Instead of remanding
the case and ordering a full determination of the
constitutional and statutory issues involved, as
both the Times and the state attorney general had
recommended," the court invoked its original ju-
risdiction for the limited purpose of making find-
ings of fact necessary to the disposition of the case.
By so doing, the justices deprived the Times of
notice, of any opportunity for response through
briefing, and of any chance to present evidence or
witnesses or to cross-examine defense witnesses-
• See, e.g., United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517,
520 (9th Cir. 1976); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); United
States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229, 232 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), af/'d without opinion, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan.
573, 581 P.2d 812, 815 (1978), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 99 S.
Ct. 1265 (1979); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 269-70,
315 A.2d 254, 255 (1974); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d
601, 618-19, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287 (1978).
259 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 338.
'2r Remand brief for Attorney General at 12. Reply
brief for Appellants at 13.
all possible abridgements of due process. The ma-
jority's "fact-finding" was nothing more than a
dependence upon the conclusions of the trial judge
based "solely" on his "examination of a handful of
newspaper articles" 26' and "conclusory allegations"
"taken substantially verbatim" from the brief for
defendant Jascalevich.2 "'2 As Justice Pashman con-
cluded in dissent: "This amalgam of post hoc, ex
parte and newspaper article 'factfinding' is not my
idea of what a Shield Law hearing is all about. '2 '
Another due process concern not even addressed
by the New Jersey court was the manner in which
Farber was served with notice of the criminal
contempt charge. Interpretation of the Uniform
Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings is beyond
the scope of this comment. But in light of the due
process problems in this case, it bears noting that
Farber was originally served with notice of the
criminal contempt charge in New York. At a later
hearing in the New Jersey Superior Court, Farber's
attorneys argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
over him because the order to show cause had been
served outside New Jersey. The court then ordered
Jascalevich's counsel to seek an order in aid of a
litigant and to pursue this remedy in New York
under the Uniform Witness Attendance Act. Under
both the language of that statute,2" and the court's
certificate of materiality in aid of a litigant, Farber
was promised immunity from service of criminal
process while he was in New Jersey. Acting upon
those assurances, a New York Supreme Court jus-
tice on July 18 ordered Farber to respond to the
civil contempt proceeding that had been initiated
in Jascalevich's behalf. And yet, while Farber was
in the New Jersey courtroom later that same day,
the trial court allowed service upon Farber in the
criminal contempt matter, even though he pro-
tested that he was in New Jersey only under com-
pulsion and should be immune from service. The
attorney general argued that the civil and criminal
proceedings were so intertwined that Farber's pres-
262 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 347 (Pashman, J., dis-
senting).
262/d.
2r1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-21 (West 1976) provides in
pertinent part:
If a person comes into this state in obedience to
a summons directing him to attend and testify in
this state he shall not, while in this state pursuant
to such summons, be subject to arrest or the service
of process, civil or criminal, in connection with
matters which arose before his entrance into this
state under the summons.
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ence in the state for one action was sufficient to
validate service for the other, but the whole chain
of events raises serious questions as to the motiva-
tion for seeking a second contempt citation. Indeed,
it would seem a clear violation of due process if the
Uniform Witness Attendance Act and a judge's
certificate were actually used to accomplish the
equivalent of extradition in order to effect service
of a criminal citation.
Finally, it should be noted that the New York
court originally issued the subpoena duces tecum
only after emphasizing that "New Jersey courts are
bound to allow full faith and credit to the laws of
New York when necessary to protect the statutory
entitlement of New York citizens." 20 Section 79-h
of the New York shield law specifically provides
that, "no professional journalist ... shall be ad-
judged in contempt by any court ... for refusing or
failing to disclose any news or the source of any
such news.... ,268 People v. Marahan67 and People v.
Monroe26 held that before a newsman can be de-
prived of the protection of section 79-h, he must be
granted a hearing on the issues, including relevancy
and materiality.269 Myron Farber received no such
hearing and, despite the unequivocal language of
the New York law, he spent forty days in jail for
contempt of court.
It is the contention of this comment that there
were several procedural errors in the Farber liti-
gation at the trial level that warranted a reversal
of the newsman's contempt convictions by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. Furthermore, this comment
argues that the state supreme court decision did
not accurately reflect the development of judicial
thinking since Branzburg.
The most critical flaw of In re Farber lies in its
interpretation of Branzburg. Responding to the ap-
pellants' argument for a newsman's privilege
grounded in the first amendment, the court de-
clared: "[11n our view the Supreme Court of the
United States has clearly rejected this claim and
has squarely held that no such First Amendment
right exists." 270 The court also refused to acknowl-
edge the significance of Justice Powell's concur-
rence in Branzburg. "We do not read Justice Powell's
opinion as in any way disagreeing with what is
2405 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
• N.Y. Civ. RGmHTs LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp.
1978).
26' 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
268 82 Misc. 2d 850,370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
m 81 Misc. 2d at 643-44, 650-51, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 692,
698. 82 Misc. 2d at 856-57, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 1013-14.
2'0 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 333.
said by Justice White." 271 These denials were cru-
cial, for they enabled the Farber majority to ignore
Justice White's declaration that news-gathering is
entitled to first amendment protection 272 and Jus-
tice Powell's concluding recommendation of case-
by-case balancing.2 73 Having deprived the media
of its first amendment defense, the New Jersey
court was no longer confronted with a clash of
competing constitutional values. It was able to
decide the dilemma as a simple matter of statute-
versus-Constitution, with the NewJersey shield law
predictably giving way to the assertion of a para-
mount sixth amendment interest.
Furthermore, the court failed to distinguish ad-
equately between the different circumstances un-
der which Branzburg and Farber arose. Branzburg
involved grand jury appearances by reporters who
had either witnessed actual criminal activity or
who were believed to have direct, personal knowl-
edge of crimes. Because of their investigatory func-
tion, grand juries are less restricted in seeking
evidence and in the procedures they must follow.
Farber, on the other hand, arose in the context of a
criminal trial. in which the reporter was a third
party who had not personally witnessed the com-
mission of any crime.
The court ignored the limited nature of the
Branzburg holding emphasized by both Justice
White and Justice Powell, and disregarded Justice
White's suggestion in Branzburg that state legisla-
tures dissatisfied with the Court's ruling were free
to enact or amend existing shield laws to provide
greater protection for newsmen274-an invitation
the New Jersey State Assembly had obviously ac-
cepted. 5
Since Branzburg there has been an evolution in
support of recognition of a newsman's privilege.
2 7 6
In the area of criminal trials, most, though not all,
courts today accept the existence of such a privi-
lege, and trace its source to the first amendment
and its recognition to Branzburg.27 This is true even
in instances where the charge has been murder.
The Virginia, Wisconsin, and Kansas state su-
preme courts all have been faced with appeals from
murder trials in which the defendant had sought
to learn the identity of a reporter's news source,
271 Id. at -, 394 A.2d at 334.
272408 U.S. at 681.
2
" Id. at 710.
274 Id. at 706.
275 See note 235 & accompanying text supra.
2 76 See notes 97, 100, 105, 112, 121, 128, & 131 &
accompanying text supra.
2See note 129 supra.
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but the reporters refused to testify.2 78 In each of
those cases, the courts cited Branzburg as providing
the foundation for newsman's privilege. In two of
the three appeals, the state court affirmed the
convictions and upheld the reporter's right to pro-
tect his sources. 279 All three state supreme courts
applied a balancing test to the defendant's demand
for disclosure and all three utilized the "material-
ity/relevancy" standard in weighing the competing
values. In the one case in which the reporter was
ordered to testify, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court finding that the defendant's need for the
information "outweighed" the claim of privilege.
2
80
The approach followed in these cases is far different
from the indiscriminate, all-encompassing order
issued without a hearing to determine materiality
or relevance in the Jascalevich trial which was
upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
None of these three states had a newsman's
privilege statute. Their recognition of a protection
for the press was based on the first amendment
and, in the Wisconsin case, the corollary freedom
of the press section of the state constitution." It is
ironic that in a state where the legislature had
taken a bold statutory step specifically designed to
further safeguard this right, the state's highest court
would find the shield law to be an unconstitutional
abrogation of the sixth amendment. Such an inter-
pretation was unnecessary, for the New Jersey
shield law as written did not have to be construed
as a violation of a defendant's rights.
Myron Farber was not called to testify before
the grand jury that indicted Mario Jascalevich, nor
were any of his notes or files examined by the
grand jury. Farber also was never called as a
witness by the state during Jascalevich's criminal
trial and none of his files were entered in evidence
by the prosecution. 2 The copy of the missing
Jascalevich deposition the reporter had uncovered
during his investigation-the only thing he ever
turned over to the prosecutor2a-was available to
both state and defense counsel before and during
278 State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812
(1978), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 1265 (1979); Brown
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d
601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978).
279 214 Va. at 758, 204 S.E.2d at 431; 83 Wis. 2d at
619-21, 266 N.W.2d at 287-88.
2581 P.2d at 816.
281 WIs. CONST. art. I, § 3.
2'2 Author's interview with Sybil Moses, assistant
prosecutor, Bergen County, New Jersey.
2'.3 Appellants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, New
York Times Co. v. New Jersey, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 598
(1978) (denial of certiorari). See also trial testimony of
trial, and could have been secured under discovery
rules. In this respect, the statutory privilege Farber
invoked did not violate the defendant's right "to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." As
far as the right "to have compulsory process for
obtaining [wlitnesses in his favor," the fact remains
that Farber had never been present during any of
the events of 1965 and 1966 that led to Dr. Jascal-
evich's indictment, and there was absolutely no
indication that anyone Farber had interviewed
who might be qualified to testify in the doctor's
behalf was not otherwise available to the defense
through application of the sixth amendment. 284
Serious questions about hearsay evidence and the
admissibility of his interview notes also would have
been raised had the reporter been compelled to
appear on behalf of the defendant. To require
Farber's testimony under such circumstances
would be to make the reporter an arm of the
defense and certainly would constitute an infringe-
ment of first amendment rights.
Although In re Farber was decided incorrectly by
the New Jersey Supreme Court, there will be no
review or reversal of that decision for the United
States Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari
in the case.285 Farber thus remains the law in New
Jersey. Of greater concern now is the impact Farber
will have on journalists, judges, and criminal at-
torneys nationwide. Because the case involved the
nation's best-known and most-respected newspa-
per, it attracted enormous publicity. The defeat of
the New York Times in this case could have a much
greater effect than the many successful newsman's
privilege cases brought by other less well-known
newspapers in recent years. It could result in more
demands upon reporters to testify or turn over their
notes. Smaller, less wealthy newspapers, aware of
the $500,000r the Times spent in fines and legal
fees and of the forty days Farber spent in jail,
may be reluctant to even challenge subpoenas. It
also may motivate more decisions like that made
by the editors of the Sacramento Bee, who announced
they would no longer print information from con-
fidential sources because they feared the possibility
of their reporters being jailed.28 7 Such an anounce-
ment brings to mind the words ofJustice Douglas,
who wrote in Branzburg that the specter of forced in
former Bergen County, NewJersey, Prosecuting Attorney
Joseph Woodcock, Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1978, § B,
at 1, col. 1.
• See note 10 supra.
New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, -U.S.-, 99
S. Ct. 598 (1978) (denial of certiorari).
2 See note 149 supra.
287 Sacramento Bee, Sept. 29, 1978, § B, at 4, col. 5.
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camera disclosure would "cause editors and critics
to write with more restrained pens."
' ' 8
At the same time, Farber may motivate more
state legislatures to consider the adoption, or
amendment, of more protective shield laws. At the
appellate level, Farber may prove to be merely an
aberration in what appeared to be, prior to the
New Jersey decision, a developing judicial trend
toward recognition of a qualified newsman's priv-
ilege. Other jurisdictions may simply choose to
ignore Farber. It could, however, spark a shift in the
delicate balance between the constitutional rights
of free press and fair trial, and there is some initial
sign that this is occurring. Both the New Jersey
Supreme Court opinion and the language ofJustice
White's refusal to grant a stay in the case were
recently cited in a reported lower court decision
denying a newsman's privilege to a reporter in
Vermont.? And, according to the national Re-
porters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Farber
was cited approvingly in an unreported federal
bench decision.29
As has been noted, trial courts have tended to
construe state shield laws strictly rather than gen-
erously, even in states where legislators have at-
tempted to fashion broad or "absolute" privilege
statutes. One possible response to Farber might be
for legislators to formulate procedures for auto-
matic or expedited appeal of mid-trial orders by
judges involving disclosure of a reporter's confiden-
tial sources or information. Such a system might
not have affected the result in Farber, but it could
have kept the reporter out ofjail or at least reduced
the length of his incarceration.
A more comprehensive response to the entire
newsman's privilege problem might be derived by
applying a formula similar to the "exclusionary
rule" doctrine of Weeks v. United States29 1 and Mapp
v. Ohio2 2 to the disclosure criteria enunciated by
Justice Stewart in his Branzburg dissent and since
adooted in part by several other courts.m
Under the terms of the exclusionary rule, the
Supreme Court, and the many state courts that
adopted it prior to Mapp,2 held that the fourth
mBranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
' In re Powers, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1600 (Vt. Dist.
Ct. 1978).
s' United States v. Digilio, No. 74-313 (D.N.J. 1978)
(magistrate's opinion).
29'232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2" 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
*'9 See notes 75 & 135 & accompanying text supra.
"" 367 U.S. at 651; see, e.g., Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 224-32 app. (1960); People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); City of Chicago v.
amendment's right of privacy from arbitrary intru-
sion is so essential to a free society and so worthy
of protection that the courts would exclude from
trial evidence that had been illegally obtained by
the police from a defendant in derogation of his
constitutional protection from unreasonable search
and seizure. In reality, this often results in the
dismissal of charges or the reversal of convictions,
because the preservation of constitutional rights is
deemed to be more important to our society than
the conviction and punishment of a single criminal.
It certainly can be argued that the freedoms
guaranteed by the first amendment are just as
essential to a free society as those of the fourth
amendment. And so, when the first and sixth
amendments collide, the solution might well lie in
another type of exclusionary rule. Thus, if a de-
fendant were able to demonstrate with sufficient
precision that a reporter's notes or sources were
absolutely essential to his defense, and he could
meet the relevancy, materiality, exhaustion of al-
ternative sources, and compelling need tests
adopted in such cases as State v. St. Peter,s Brown
v. Commonwealth,2 Zelenka v. State,2 7 and Florida v.
Hurston,ns the court would be required to dismiss
the charge, or upon appeal, reverse the conviction.
The rationale for such an approach would be that
the preservation of the constitutional rights of the
accused person, the press, and the public are more
important to our society than the conviction of a
single defendant. The factual situations and deci-
sions in criminal cases involving claims of news-
man's privilege since Branzburg suggest that such a
constitutional confrontation would not arise often
and, given the burden of proof the defendant
would have to meet, it is doubtful that many guilty
men or women would go free. It might well be a
small price to pay to insure the preservation of a
free press.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial acceptance of the newsman's privilege
has been grudging and gradual over the past 130
years, but an examination of the cases decided
since Branzburg v. Hayes in 1972 suggests that rec-
Lord, 7 11. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955); People v.
Castree, 311111. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
2" 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); see note 138 &
accompanying text supra.
26 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
966 (1974); see notes 133, 135 & 138 & accompanying
text supra.
2783 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978); see text
accompanying note 282 supra.
'a 3 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2295 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978).
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ognition of a qualified or conditional privilege,
grounded in the first amendment, has been
achieved in a majority of the jurisdictions where
the issue has been considered. The fact that the
privilege is now acknowledged however, does not
mean that its exercise is always permitted.
A reporter's right to refuse to disclose the identity
of his sources or confidential information has been
accepted most often in civil litigation, especially
when the newsman is not a party to the case. It
also has been recognized in criminal cases, includ-
ing murder trials, when the defendant is unable to
demonstrate that the journalist's knowledge is ma-
terial and relevant to the central issue of guilt or
innocence. Other tests, including exhaustion of
alternative sources and "compelling need," have
been employed by some judges in attempting to
determine whether disclosure should be ordered in
criminal cases.
Following Branzburg, courts still require newsmen
to appear and testify before grand juries, especially
when they have witnessed a crime. But even in this
area, some judges have suggested first amendment
limitations on the questions a grand jury can posh
to a reporter.
Since 1972, seventeen states have enacted or
amended news media shield laws, bringing to
twenty-six the number of states with privilege stat-
utes for journalists. Despite this flurry of legislative
activity Congress has never taken any final action
on any of the proposals for a federal shield law,
and state courts sometimes interpret the local laws
quite strictly, thus depriving reporters of their pro-
tection.
The most noted newsman's privilege case in
recent years has been In re Farber, the judicial battle
that resulted in the jailing of a reporter for forty
days. It is the contention of this comment that the
Farber case was poorly decided at both the trial and
appellate levels. The trial judge's refusal to conduct
a hearing on the substantive issues before ordering
in camera inspection of the reporter's confidential
files or before contempt of court judgments were
entered was improper. The New Jersey Supreme
Court did not correct this serious error. That court
tailed to recognize the growing legal acceptance of
a constitutional basis for the newsman's privilege.
The state court also struck down one of the nation's
most comprehensive shield laws when Supreme
Court precedents did not suggest that such a ruling
was necessary.
There have been at least forty contempt judg-
ments handed down against reporters in the years
since Branzburg, resulting in at least a dozen actual
jailings lasting from a few hours to several weeks.29
The trend in the last few years has appeared to be
more favorable toward journalists' claims of privi-
lege, but the Farber decision now raises serious
questions about whether the pendulum is once
again swinging away from protection for the press.
Almost forty years ago, in Bridges v. Califomia,"
Mr. Justice Black wrote that "free speech and fair
trials are two of the most cherished policies of our
civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose
between them."3' That statement acknowledges
the possibility of conflict between the two freedoms,
but more importantly, it recognizes the constitu-
tional foundations of both-a realization that has
been too often lacking in cases involving newsman's
privilege. Accommodation based on balancing is
the key to preserving these rights and that can best
be achieved through a case-by-case approach, as
Justices Powell and Stewart suggested in their
Branzburg opinions. This comment supports that
approach, but it also has attempted to advance
some alternative policies and procedures that
might further safeguard the newsman's privilege
and the public's right to a vigorous and informative
free press.
Stephen R. H-ofer
299 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1978, § B, at 7, col. I.
a" 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
3' Id at 260.
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